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In the Klamaths, winters are mild enough and summers moist
enough for species to grow together that are elsewhere segregated
by elevation or latitude.  Several species that once grew throughout
the West now survive only in the Klamaths.
. . . .
More than any other wild region I’ve known, the Klamaths have
a venerable quality which is not synonymous with “pristine,” “un-
spoiled,” or other adjectives commonly applied to natural areas.
. . . .
. . . [T]hese adjectives imply something of the smoothness and
plumpness of youth, whereas the Klamaths are marked by the
wrinkles and leanness of great age.  Although their peaks and high
plateaus have been marked by glaciers, they are at heart preglacial
mountains, with elements of flora and fauna that reach back far-
ther into the past than any place west of the Mississippi River.  The
Klamaths seem so old, in fact, that I’d call them a grandparent of
the Sierra and Cascades instead of a sibling.1
The Klamath Basin has long been a forgotten basin.  It is geo-
graphically isolated, divided by many state and regional bounda-
ries, and always presumed to be in someone else’s jurisdiction
and thus is someone else’s problem.  Yet historically it was the
third largest producer of salmon in the United States, behind
only the Columbia River Basin and the California Central Valley
Basin.2
The indigenous peoples of the Klamath Basin have always had
a salmon-dependent economy, as did European settlers in the re-
gion until recent times.  Before European development, the Kla-
math was estimated to have produced between 660,000 and 1.1
million returning adult salmonids annually, with an average of
880,000.3  Today, however, so much of the salmon-carrying ca-
1 DAVID RAINS WALLACE, THE KLAMATH KNOT 6-14 (2d ed., Univ. of Cal. Press
2003).
2 Institute of Fisheries Res., Estimates of Pre-Development Klamath River
Salmon Run Size 2 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
3 Id.  at 2 tbl.2.
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pacity of the Klamath Basin has been destroyed by misplaced
development and loss of habitat that adult salmonid returns now
average only about 9.7% of historic numbers, including supple-
mental hatchery fish, with natural spawners at only about 6.9%
of historic numbers.4  Some stocks, such as coho salmon and
spring-run Chinook, are down to less than 2% of their historic
abundance.5  Harvest of all Klamath-origin salmonid stocks6 now
has to be carefully constrained to avoid impacts on these very
weak stocks, at great economic cost.7
Salmonid production in the Klamath Basin has also been heav-
ily impacted by almost every conceivable habitat problem, from
massive clearcut logging in the past, to pollution from mining op-
erations past and present, widespread water diversions in the up-
per Basin and many of its tributaries, and dams built since 1917
with no fish passage that also create huge water quality
problems.8  These combined impacts currently threaten to drive
wild salmonids in the Basin to extinction.  Some salmonid spe-
cies, such as chum salmon, were once common to the Basin but
are now presumed extinct.  Other once-common fish species,
such as green sturgeon, are also seriously depressed for similar
reasons.9  Literally dozens of agencies have partial jurisdiction
over the Klamath, but none have any real control over all the
factors leading to its ecological decline.
4 OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, PUBL’N
NO. FERC/EIS-0201D, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR HYDRO-
POWER LICENSE, KLAMATH HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT FERC PROJECT NO. 2082-
027, at 3-179 tbl.3-47 (2006) [hereinafter KLAMATH HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT
DEIS], available at  http://elibrary-backup.ferc.gov/idmws/File_list.asp?document_
id=4441449.
5 See NW. FISHERIES SCI. CTR. & SW. FISHERIES SCI. CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF COM-
MERCE, PUBL’N NO. NMFS-NWFSC-66, UPDATED STATUS OF FEDERALLY LISTED
ESUS OF WEST COAST SALMON AND STEELHEAD 340 tbl.72 (Thomas P. Good et al.
eds., 2005), available at  http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/Publications/Biological-Status-Re-
views/upload/SR2005-allspecies.pdf.
6 The various distinct salmonid species referred to—Chinook, coho, chum, and
steelhead—all members of the genus Oncorhynchus , are loosely called salmon but
are also collectively referred to as salmonids throughout this Article.
7 See infra  Part II.
8 See infra  Part I.C.3.
9 See  Threatened Status for the Southern DPS of North American Green Stur-
geon, 71 Fed. Reg. 17,757 (Apr. 7, 2006) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223).
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I
THE IMPACT OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT ON
WATER LAW IN THE KLAMATH BASIN
In the arid Klamath Basin, where water is the limiting factor
for so many species as well as for most human development,
water conflicts are nothing new.  However, the recent overlay of
federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) water requirements atop
often-conflicting state water laws creates new sources of friction.
Widespread water over-appropriation and short-sighted water
mismanagement has been the rule rather than the exception in
the Klamath Basin.  In fact, the Basin is a prototype of every-
thing gone wrong with western water law and policy.  Today,
however, it is also a laboratory for potential solutions.
Major water reforms are needed in the Basin, where limited
water resources have long been over-appropriated, and getting
more so every year.10  A major symptom of this widespread
water over-appropriation has been the emergence of federal list-
ings under the ESA for species of both resident and anadromous
fish.  These ESA listings are now driving much-needed, but long-
delayed, water reforms.  As a result, in recent years the Klamath
Basin has become the congressional poster child for everything
that is wrong or right, depending on one’s political point of view,
with both the ESA itself and with western water law and policy
generally.
This Article is an overview of some of the major water con-
flicts in the Klamath Basin, how these conflicts are being shaped
by the ESA, and how these important policy issues and conflicts
are being dealt with by the federal court system, the George W.
Bush administration, and Congress.  It is hoped that the lessons
to be learned from the Klamath Basin can help foster similar re-
forms elsewhere.
10 Editorial, Willing Sellers , OREGONIAN (Portland), Aug. 12, 2001, at F4.  Both
ESA-listed species and tribal water rights are legally prior to state-issued water
rights for irrigation. See  Klamath Water Users Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206,
1213 (9th Cir. 1996).  Yet neither the water needs of ESA-listed species nor tribal
water rights are set aside or deducted from the “available water” for purposes of
reviewing water permit applications for irrigation in Oregon or California, both of
which obtain water from the Basin.  Thus, under obsolete state water rights laws that
do not take fish and wildlife needs or tribal treaty rights into account, already-seri-
ous water shortfalls are still being constantly exacerbated.
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A. “Water, water, every where, Nor any drop to drink”11
There is no question that most West Coast salmonids are in an
extinction crisis.  Salmonid streams in the Northwest and north-
ern California have lost about 80% of their productive capacity
as a direct result of various well-known causes of watershed de-
struction, including over-diversion of river water.12  This repre-
sents an annual loss of many billions of fishing-dependent dollars
and tens of thousands of jobs from the West Coast salmon econ-
omy as well as the loss of a primary West Coast food source and
export.13
According to a landmark 1991 comprehensive scientific status
assessment by the American Fisheries Society, at least 106 major
populations of salmon and steelhead on the West Coast are al-
ready extinct, and an estimated 214 additional salmon runs are
now at varying degrees of risk of extinction in the near future:
101 at high-risk of extinction, 58 at moderate-risk of extinction,
and another 55 of special concern.14
In response to the American Fisheries Society and numerous
citizen petitions for protection, many of the most depressed
salmonid populations are now federally listed under the ESA,
and thus protected against many federal actions that might de-
plete their numbers or destroy their habitat.  At present there are
26 separate and evolutionarily distinct stocks of salmonids in Cal-
ifornia, Oregon, and Washington protected under the ESA.15
In the vast majority of these declines, and in most every
salmonid ESA listing, sheer lack of water has been identified as a
11 SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, THE RIME OF THE ANCIENT MARINER 35 (Paul
H. Fry ed., Bedford/St. Martin’s 1999) (1817).
12 OR. BUSINESS COUNCIL, A NEW VISION FOR PACIFIC SALMON 1 (1996), availa-
ble at  http://orbusinesscouncil.org/docs/newvision.pdf; Willa Nehlsen et al., Pacific
Salmon at the Crossroads: Stocks at Risk from California, Oregon, Idaho, and Wash-
ington , FISHERIES, Mar./Apr. 1991, at 4.
13 Salmon losses in the Columbia River alone have an economic impact estimated
at $500 million annually, resulting in the loss of more than 25,000 family-wage jobs.
1 INST. FOR FISHERIES RES., THE COST OF DOING NOTHING: THE ECONOMIC BUR-
DEN OF SALMON DECLINES IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN 2 (1996).
14 Nehlsen, supra  note 12, at 11 tbl.1, 16. R
15 For a current compilation of West Coast salmonid ESA listings, see Northwest
Regional Office, Endangered Species Status of West Coast Salmon & Steelhead,
http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/ESA-Salmon-Listings/Salmon-Populations/upload/1pgr06-
06.pdf (last visited May 4, 2007).
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major contributing factor.16  The water resources of the majority
of West Coast basins are now over-appropriated during some
part of each year.17  In other words, there are now more legal
water withdrawals allowed from most West Coast river systems
than there is water available without seriously jeopardizing fish
and wildlife.
To underscore this point, a recent survey of salmon problems
commissioned by the legislatures of California and Oregon con-
cluded that, “Diversion of water is potentially one of the most
serious factors adversely affecting salmon in western Oregon and
northern California.”18  Thus the fate of West Coast salmonids is
inextricably linked to rapidly diminishing in-river flows through-
out the arid West.  Recovery of many of those species is going to
be difficult, if not impossible, without major water reforms in
over-appropriated rivers such as the Klamath.
B. The ESA in Operation in the Klamath
There have been several efforts to bring special ESA protec-
tions to the Klamath Basin to prevent further fish extinctions.
Coho salmon, once a very important anadromous species in the
Basin, is now listed as threatened with extinction under both the
federal ESA and the California Endangered Species Act.19  Two
16 See, e.g. , Threatened Status for Central California Coho Salmon Evolutionary
Significant Unit, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,138, 56,141 (Oct. 31, 1996) (identifying “dewater-
ing” of river habitat as a factor in the decline of coho salmon).
17 Holly Doremus, Water, Population Growth, and Endangered Species in the
West , 72 U. COL. L. REV. 361, 377 (2001); see also  1 E. GEORGE ROBISON, OR.
WATER RES. DEP’T, WATER AVAILABILITY FOR OREGON’S RIVERS AND STREAMS
13 tbl.2 (1991) (summary of water availability in Oregon showing that of 169 state-
wide sites, 110, or 65%, had water availability shortfalls at least one month out of
the year).  More recent maps of water availability in Oregon developed by
WaterWatch of Oregon show even greater over-appropriation.
18 8 DANIEL BOTKIN ET AL., STATUS AND FUTURE OF SALMON OF WATERN ORE-
GON AND NOTHERN CALIFORNIA: FINDINGS AND OPTIONS 101 (1995).
19 See  Endangered and Threatened Listing for 16 ESUs of West Coast Salmon, 70
Fed. Reg. 37,160 (June 28, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 223, 224); CAL.
DEP’T OF FISH & GAME, THE STATUS OF RARE, THREATENED, AND ENDANGERED
PLANTS AND ANIMALS OF CALIFORNIA 2000-2004, at 68-71 (2005), available at  http:/
/www.dfg.ca.gov/hcpb/species/t_e_spp/Final%20Reportpaginated.pdf.  Several dis-
tinct populations of northern California coho salmon, including those in the Kla-
math, were also separately listed under the California Endangered Species Act on
March 30, 2005, by the California Fish and Game Commission.  10-Z Cal. Regula-
tory Notice Reg. 327 (Feb. 28, 2005) (codified at CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14,
§ 670.5(b)(2)(E) (2006)).  Chum salmon, once common and closely related to coho,
are now extinct in the Klamath Basin. ORTLAY W. JOHNSON ET AL., NW. FISHERIES
SCI. CTR., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, PUBL’N NO. NMFS/NWFSC-32, STATUS RE-
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other resident fish-species dependent on upper-Basin aquatic
habitats and culturally and economically important to the Kla-
math Tribes—the Lost River sucker, known to the Klamath
Tribes as the “c’waam,” and the shortnose sucker, the “qapdo”—
have been ESA-listed since 1988.20
Once a species qualifies for ESA listing, fish and wildlife agen-
cies have three major tools to prevent the extinction—take
prohibitions, consultation requirements and protection of critical
habitat.  All three are in operation in the Klamath Basin.
1. Section 9 Take Prohibitions
Section 9 of the ESA, the legal prohibition against “take” of an
ESA-listed species, represents the real teeth of the Act.21   What
constitutes a prohibited take is defined broadly, and includes ac-
tions “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, cap-
ture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”22
“Harm” is also broadly defined in the ESA, and means “an act
which actually kills or injures wildlife.  Such act may include sig-
nificant habitat modification or degradation where it actually
kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behav-
ioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.”23
The Supreme Court has ruled that significant modification or
degradation of protected species’ habitat is appropriately in-
cluded in the definition of harm, and that Congress intended this
provision be interpreted broadly.24
The first salmonid water-related action that was barred by the
courts as an illegal take under the ESA was the sucking of Sacra-
VIEW OF CHUM SALMON FROM WASHINGTON, OREGON, AND CALIFORNIA 164
(1997), available at  http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/Publications/Biological-Status-Re-
views/upload/SR1997-chum.pdf.
20 Determination of Endangered Status for the Shortnose Sucker and Lost River
Sucker, 53 Fed. Reg. 27,130 (July 18, 1988) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).  Originally
called mullet, the term “suckers” has been used in recent years and is now the ac-
cepted taxonomical term.  An abundant recreational and commercial sucker fishery
as well as an important subsistence fishery for the Klamath Tribes once existed in
Upper Klamath Lake.  Today there are no harvests, and the Klamath Tribes are
allowed only one fish per year for ceremonial purposes.  Laurence M. Cruz,
Drought, Government Policies Bring Klamath Area to Crisis , STATESMAN J. (Salem,
Or.), Sept. 24, 2001, at 1C.
21 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2006).
22 Id.  § 1532(19).
23 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2006).
24 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Comtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687,
699-701 (1995).
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mento River winter-run Chinook into massive pumps for irriga-
tion water diversions.25  Most early salmonid ESA-take cases
were of this type, where physical entrainment led directly to ob-
served mortality.  In Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District , the remedy
was an injunction preventing pumping through an unscreened
water diversion at times when ESA-listed winter-run Chinook
might be affected, followed by a diversion-point fish screen.26
More recently though, a number of Biological Opinions (Bi-
Ops) issued under the section 7 consultation provisions of the
ESA, particularly in the Klamath, have ruled that reducing water
flows too far can also create jeopardy for salmonids.27  The defi-
nition of jeopardy is thus now much broader and more biologi-
cally based than just finding dead fish.  Both the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (USFWS) and the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NOAA Fisheries)28 have defined jeopardy to include ac-
tions “that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly,
to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and re-
covery of a listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduc-
tion, numbers, or distribution of that species.”29
The clearest instance in which a court upheld water diversions
alone as constituting a prohibited take is a Klamath Basin case
challenging the legitimacy of ESA-required irrigation reductions
for irrigation water users of the federal Bureau of Reclamation’s
Klamath Irrigation Project (Project) during the near-record 2001
drought.30  Because of a court order, the Bureau of Reclamation
25 United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1135 (E.D.
Cal. 1992).
26 Id.  These winter-run Chinook were the first salmonid stock to be listed under
the ESA.  Following an emergency listing, they were permanently listed in 1990.  At
the time they were listed, their numbers were down to 189 individuals, reduced from
prior populations in the several hundreds of thousands.  Endangered Status for the
Sacramento River Winter-Run Chinook, 55 Fed. Reg. 46,515 (Nov. 5, 1990).
27 See, e.g. , NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION: KLAMATH
PROJECT OPERATION 49 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 KLAMATH PROJECT BIOP], availa-
ble at  http://www.usbr.gov/mp/mp150/envdocs/kbao/KpopBO2002finalMay31.pdf.
28 National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is an agency of the National Ocean
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).  NMFS has now changed its name to
NOAA Fisheries. See  Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 254 F.
Supp. 2d 1196, 1199 n.2 (D. Or. 2003).  For ease, this Article adopts the name change
and refers to the agency as NOAA Fisheries throughout, even for reference to his-
torical agency actions that occurred before the change.
29 See  50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2006).
30 That year’s drought was the worst in 72 years in the already arid upper Klamath
Basin.  In the average year, there is approximately only thirteen inches of rainfall
per year at Klamath Falls, Or. AGRIC. EXPERIMENTAL STATION, OR. STATE UNIV.,
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was required to consult with the Services31 under section 7 of the
ESA on its 2001 water plan, and in light of the severe drought
conditions, the Bureau’s initial irrigation plan, which proposed
more-or-less normal year irrigation allotments, was rejected.32
The Services then required the Bureau to make a number of
changes in its 2001 Project water plan, including sharply reducing
Project water deliveries to keep more water in-river for
threatened coho salmon and in Upper Klamath Lake for resident
sucker fish.
The Project-dependent irrigators sued to overturn those 2001
BiOps in Kandra v . United States , asserting, among other argu-
ments, that ESA-driven water restrictions on the Project were so
egregious that they were inconsistent with the primary mission of
the Project and thus illegal.33  The court rejected all these argu-
ments, and ruled that the water-scarcity mitigation measures
RESEARCH IN THE KLAMATH BASIN, 2002 REPORT 1 (2002) available at  http://
oregonstate.edu/dept/kes/report02.htm.  Rainfall at Klamath Falls for 2001 was only
10.03 inches. Id.  at 4 tbl.1.  However, much of that rainfall came too late in the
irrigation year for most crop uses.  Hydrological data for the Upper Klamath Basin
(Hydrological Unit 18010206) can be obtained from the U.S. Geological Survey’s
National Water Information System (NWIS), http://waterdata.usgs.gov/or/nwis/nwis
(last visited May 6, 2007).
31 The USFWS and the NOAA Fisheries both administer the ESA, the former for
terrestrial and inland species, the latter for anadromous salmonids.  Collectively the
ESA refers to them as “the Services,” and for consistency the same nomenclature is
used herein.
32 During 2000, ignoring its ESA obligations, the Bureau of Reclamation had sim-
ply refused to consult under section 7 on the impacts of its Klamath Project’s 2000
Annual Operations Plan, resulting in a lawsuit.  On April 3, 2001, the Bureau was
ordered to consult with the Services on its 2001 Annual Operations Plan, and also
enjoined the Bureau from any further water deliveries to its contract irrigators until
it did so.  Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
138 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1250 (N.D. Cal. 2001).  That consultation was speedily com-
pleted and two 2001 BiOps were issued a few days later which, for the first time,
were based on flow needs for lower river coho salmon developed in the Hardy Flow
Study and on minimum lake level needs for endangered suckers.  Both BiOps re-
jected the initial “irrigation as usual” water plan proposed by the Bureau of Recla-
mation as presenting too high a risk of extinction.  Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s
Ass’ns. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, No. C02-02006-SBA, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13745, at *13-*14 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2003), rev’d on other grounds , 426 F.3d 1082
(9th Cir. 2005).  The rejection effectively shifted priorities for water allocation in the
upper Basin to prevention of fish extinctions and away from maximizing fulfillment
of irrigation demands for the first time in the ninety years of the Project’s existence.
33 Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1207 (D. Or. 2001).
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which protected ESA-listed fish could be required of the Bureau
and were consistent with the ESA.34
The Services also have been experimenting with “4(d) Rules”
under 16 U.S.C § 1533(d) to specify what, specifically, “take” is
not.35  This rather open-ended section allows the adoption of
protective regulations to provide for the conservation of the spe-
cies.  These 4(d) Rules are now used by NOAA Fisheries to pro-
mote certain types of restoration efforts as safe-harbor incentives
to states and landowners to make these efforts by relieving them
in advance of ESA take liability, and a number of such take limi-
tations or exemptions have now been adopted.36
2. Section 7 Consultations
Section 7 of the ESA is another important tool, which requires
all federal agencies to ensure that actions they carry out, fund, or
authorize are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any listed species or adversely modify its designated critical
habitat.37  However, unlike section 9, section 7 consultation obli-
gations only apply to federal “agency actions.”38
Under section 7, a federal agency proposing a project must for-
mally consult with the relevant wildlife trustee agency and re-
34 Id.  at 1211.  Many myths about the actual seriousness of the 2001 Project water
curtailments and resulting economic losses still persist in the upper Basin.  Ulti-
mately, however, thanks to timely summer rains supplemented by groundwater, the
Project still received about 67% of a normal year’s allocation.   Many Project farm-
ers not directly connected to Upper Klamath Lake received full water allocations for
that year from Gerber Reservoir and Clear Lake, where irrigation flows were unaf-
fected.  Crop losses were estimated at approximately $30 million, most of which was
compensated by the state and federal governments. See  William K. Jaeger, What
Really Happened in 2001? , in WATER ALLOCATION IN THE KLAMATH RECLAMA-
TION PROJECT, 2001, at 265, 275-76 (William S. Braunworth, Jr. et al. eds., 2002),
available at  http://extension.oregonstate.edu/catalog/html/sr/sr1037/report.pdf.
35 A “4(d) Rule” is a rule adopted pursuant to section 4(d) of the Act to provide
for “safe-harbor” mitigation measures that would avoid jeopardy. See  Endangered
Species Act of 1973 § 4(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2006).  A full discussion of this
provision is outside the scope of this Article.
36 See, e.g. , Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon and Steelhead
Evolutionary Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 42,422 (July 10, 2000) (4(d) Rule provisions).
However, the process of giving out free passes under the ESA can potentially be
abused.  Inevitably, NOAA Fisheries would be subjected to intense political pres-
sure by the states to sign off on 4(d) Rules for state forestry, agricultural, and other
land- and water-use practices, even when those practices clearly harm rather than
help listed salmonids.
37 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
38 Federal “agency action” is broadly defined as “any action authorized, funded,
or carried out by” a federal agency. Id.
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ceive a formal written BiOp as to whether the project as
proposed would cause jeopardy.39  If jeopardy is found, the Ser-
vice must then propose “recommended and prudent alterna-
tives” (RPAs) that can be undertaken to avoid that jeopardy.40
Compliance with the RPAs largely shields the action agency from
ESA liability.41  Noncompliance can be challenged in third-party
citizen-suit actions, with injunctive relief as a potential remedy.42
However, the range and scope of RPAs are limited to actions
that can be implemented in a manner consistent with the in-
tended purpose of the action, that can be implemented consis-
tent with the scope of the Federal agency’s legal authority and
jurisdiction, that [are] economically and technologically feasi-
ble, and that the Director believes would avoid the likelihood
of jeopardizing the continued existence of listed species or re-
sulting in the destruction or adverse modification of critical
habitat.43
In reality, what is consistent with the intended purpose of the
proposed action and what may be feasible often become inten-
sive bargaining issues between federal agencies, a negotiating
process subject to political interference and abuse.
Much of the current litigation regarding RPAs is about cer-
tainty.  Courts are hesitant to allow an agency to rely on future or
planned actions, or the voluntary actions of others—all of which
are inherently uncertain—as a tradeoff for the certainty of ex-
tinction if those measures do not work as hoped.44
National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vices  invalidated the Columbia River Salmon Recovery BiOp be-
cause it relied heavily on speculative future actions and measures
39 Id.  § 1536(a)-(b).
40 Id.  § 1536(b)(3)(A).
41 It is true that the agency ”may not rely solely on a . . . biological opinion to
establish conclusively its compliance with its substantive obligations under section
7(a)(2). . . .  [I]ts decision to rely on a . . . biological opinion must not have been
arbitrary or capricious.”  Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis omitted).  Still, “courts have
accorded substantial weight to a sound biological opinion in determining an agency’s
compliance with [section] 7(a)(2).”  Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835, 857
(1st Cir. 1981), rev’d sub. nom. on other grounds , Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
456 U.S. 305 (1982).
42 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1).
43 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2006).
44 See, e.g. , Or. Natural Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Or. 1998)
(invalidating a NOAA Fisheries decision, in lieu of listing the Oregon Coast coho
ESU, to rely on a largely voluntary and untested state recovery effort to protect the
species).
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\22-1\OEL102.txt unknown Seq: 13 14-AUG-07 15:35
2007] Klamath Basin 61
by non-federal entities over which there was no federal control.45
In Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations v . U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation , the court partially invalidated the
2002–12 10-year NOAA Fisheries BiOp on Lower Klamath
River flow regimes for ESA-listed coho salmon because it relied
on speculative future, and largely voluntary, actions of entities
outside of federal control for more than 43% of the water re-
quired to prevent jeopardy.46  Because RPAs are all too often
more the result of political compromises rather than based on
biology, more litigation can be expected in this area.
The consultation process in section 7 of the ESA directly af-
fects any relicensing of the Klamath Hydroelectric Project.  Since
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) dam relicens-
ing constitutes a federal action, FERC must eventually consult
with the Services to ascertain the impact of any proposed relic-
ensing of the Klamath dams.47  This is especially important re-
garding impacts to lower-river coho, which have been negatively
impacted by Iron Gate Dam and its warm-water reservoir in a
wide variety of ways.  These impacts include elevated tempera-
tures, deprivation of the river of important spawning and rearing
gravel, and the promotion of poor in-river environmental condi-
tions that encourage a wide variety of fish pathogens directly re-
sponsible for many coho and other salmonid losses in the lower
river.48
45 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1214
(D. Or. 2003).
46 Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, No.
C02-02006-SBA, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13745, at *50 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2003), rev’d
on other grounds , 426 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2005).
47 It is less clear, however, that the typically automatic one-year extension by
FERC of any existing license pending a relicensing decision requires ESA section 7
consultation.  FERC takes the position that the extensions are purely administrative,
rather than formal federal decisional actions.  The ESA, however, makes no such
clear distinction.  The Hoopa Valley Tribe of California has formally demanded such
a section 7 consultation in an effort to secure interim license extension protection
measures for ESA-listed coho pending the final outcome of those Klamath FERC
proceedings, which could take years.  Letter from Thomas P. Schlosser, Attorney,
Morisset, Schlosser, Jozwiak & McGaw to Magalie R. Salas, Sec’y, Fed. Energy Reg-
ulatory Comm’n 1 (Jan. 31, 2007), available at  http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/com-
mon/opennat.asp?fileID=11241422.
48 Glen Spain & Zeke Grader, Taking Down Klamath Dams—Restoring Fisheries ,
FISHERMEN’S NEWS, Nov. 2006, available at http://www.pcffa.org/fn-nov06.htm.
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3. State Recovery Actions and the PECE Policy
When the mitigation actions are based upon a state recovery
plan or state enforcement, then future follow-through becomes
more problematical.  The ESA, in section 4(b)(1)(A), directs the
relevant Secretary to make a determination as to whether a spe-
cies is threatened or endangered after conducting a status review
based on the best scientific and commercial data, and after taking
into account efforts by the state and foreign governments to pro-
tect a species either by predator control, protection of habitat
and food supply, or “other conservation practices.”49
The application of this provision to West Coast salmon listings
is interesting.  In early 1997, the State of Oregon tried to cut a
special deal with NOAA Fisheries to not list the seriously de-
pressed Oregon Coast coho population, based entirely on the
then-recently adopted state Oregon Coastal Salmon Restoration
Initiative, renamed the Oregon Plan for Salmon and Watersheds
but commonly referred to as the Oregon Plan.  The Oregon Plan,
adopted in early 1997, is a laudable but ambitious statewide
salmon and steelhead habitat-restoration plan that relies heavily
on proposed future  voluntary actions of landowners and pro-
posed future  agency actions to restore damaged salmon and
steelhead habitat, but which proposed no changes in Oregon’s
existing (and relatively weak) environmental and land-use laws.50
With the Oregon Plan in place, NOAA Fisheries and the State of
Oregon entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for the im-
plementation of the Oregon Plan as an alternative to an ESA
listing for Oregon Coast coho.  However, among other provi-
sions, that Memorandum of Agreement provided for termination
by either party upon thirty days’ notice.51  On that basis, NOAA
Fisheries then determined that the Oregon Coast coho popula-
tion, while seriously depressed, “[did] not warrant listing as a
49 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2006).
50 See  Oregon Plan for Salmon and Watersheds, About the Oregon Plan, http://
www.oregon.gov/OPSW/about_us.shtml#What_is_the_Oregon_Plan_for_Salmon_
and_Watersheds (last visited May 4, 2007).  Another weakness of the Oregon Plan is
that weak state environmental protections still allow continued losses of riparian
habitat, working directly against voluntary Oregon Plan restoration efforts, often
within the same watersheds.  Still another is that it does not apply to federal lands,
which comprise about one-third of all coho habitat in the State of Oregon. THE
WILDERNESS SOC’Y, PACIFIC SALMON AND FEDERAL LANDS 55 fig. 17 (1993).
51 Memorandum of Agreement between the State of Oregon and the National
Marine Fisheries Service 9 (Apr. 28, 1997) (on file with author).
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threatened or endangered species” in light of the pre-existing
state-based restoration plan—the Oregon Plan—that would ac-
complish the same goals.52
Many salmon conservation groups, though strong supporters
of the Oregon Plan in principle, were dissatisfied with this result
because they believed an ESA “safety net” was necessary to pro-
tect salmon habitat in case the Oregon Plan failed to deliver
needed restoration.  Also, without an ESA listing, adverse im-
pacts from logging, grazing, and other impactive land-use prac-
tices could not be controlled either on federal or private lands.
Thus the Oregon Natural Resources Council (now renamed Ore-
gon Wild) and many other organizations, including the Pacific
Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations (PCFFA), sued to
overturn NOAA Fisheries’ non-listing decision.  In Oregon Natu-
ral Resources Council v. Daley , the court noted:
It is incongruous for the NMFS to defer listing a species as
“threatened” because the agency is hoping for a significant al-
teration in the conditions or practices presently threatening
the long-term viability of the species. . . .  At most, the [Ore-
gon Plan] may prevent the Oregon Coast ESU from actually
reaching the “endangered” level and may ultimately allow the
NMFS to delist the species once recovery efforts are far
enough along.53
The court also took particular exception to using a voluntary
state-restoration initiative in lieu of far more lasting protections
under the ESA because the Memorandum of Agreement for im-
plementation was terminable at will by either party on 30 days’
notice.54
The court in Oregon Natural Resources Council  also ruled that
the agency cannot rely on either speculative, future or unenforce-
able (i.e., strictly voluntary) efforts of this sort, either regulatory
or non-regulatory, to deny a listing, because the complete lack of
enforcement mechanisms precludes any real assurances for the
52 Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northern California Coho, 62 Fed.
Reg. 24,588, 24,607-08 (May 6, 1997).
53 Or. Natural Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1152 (D. Or. 1998).
54 Id.  at 1158-59.  Shortly after the court reversed NOAA Fisheries’ non-listing
decision, Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber cancelled the agreement with NOAA
Fisheries, just as the court had feared.  The cancellation was, however, followed by
an effort to shore up the Oregon Plan.  The Governor later made the Oregon Plan
binding on state agencies.  Or. Exec. Order No. EO-99-01 (Jan. 8, 1999), reprinted in
38 OR. BULL., Feb. 1, 1999, at 4.  The debate over whether to list or delist the Ore-
gon Coast coho population continues.
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protection of the species.55  As a result, the Oregon Coast coho
was listed on August 10, 1998.56  Its subsequent delisting is cur-
rently being challenged.
In response to this ruling, and at the specific urging of Oregon
Governor John Kitzhaber, who feared that the Oregon Natural
Resources Council  ruling and subsequent ESA-listing might un-
dercut voluntary habitat-restoration efforts generally, NOAA
Fisheries reviewed its policy on how to treat state-based recovery
efforts for purposes of future listing decisions.  Thus, in March
2003, NOAA Fisheries and USFWS announced the final joint
policy, dubbed the Policy on Evaluating Conservation Efforts
(PECE), to “establish a set of consistent standards for evaluating
certain formalized conservation efforts at the time of a listing de-
cision and to ensure with a high level of certainty that formalized
conservation efforts will be implemented and effective.”57  PECE
also explored under what circumstances the Services could rely
on state conservation efforts in making a decision to not  list an
otherwise eligible species, or to list a species as threatened in-
stead of endangered.58
This new PECE policy, though untested, has potentially far-
reaching consequences.  For instance, it will likely be the basis for
Oregon’s future efforts to avoid relisting Oregon Coast coho
(and to delist other stocks) in deference to the Oregon Plan, as
well as other Bush administration efforts to delegate future ESA
salmonid-recovery programs to the states.  Washington and Cali-
fornia are also both working on state salmonid recovery plans of
their own, which could be brought under the PECE exemptions
55 Or. Natural Res. Council , 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.
56 Threatened Status for the Oregon Coast Coho Salmon, 63 Fed. Reg. 42,587
(Aug. 10, 1998).  The Oregon Coast coho was much later judicially delisted as a
result of Alsea Valley Alliance , an unrelated case involving the treatment of hatchery
fish under the ESA.  Alsea Valley Alliance v. Evans, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (D. Or.
2001), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction , 358 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2004).  With-
drawal of Proposals to List Oregon Coast Coho, 71 Fed. Reg. 3033, 3033-34 (Jan. 19,
2006).  A pending case, challenges NOAA Fisheries’ decision to not relist that stock
and seeks relisting.  Complaint at 2, Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, No. 06-01493-ST (D.
Or. June 26, 2006).  The judicial delisting of Oregon Coast coho has been much
criticized. See, e.g. , Brian J. Perron, Just Another Goldfish Down the Toilet? The
Fate of Pacific Salmon After  Alsea Valley and the De Facto Recission of the 4(d)
Rule , 33 ENVTL. L. 547, 582 (2003).
57 Policy for Evaluation of Conservation Efforts When Making Listing Decisions,
68 Fed. Reg. 15,100, 15,106 (Mar. 28, 2003).
58 Id.  at 15,110-15.
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to void some existing or warranted future salmonid listings.59
However, all these state recovery plans are flawed in various
ways, including doing little to curtail major sources of habitat loss
from destructive industrial logging practices currently legal under
weak state forestry laws.60
4. Critical Habitat Designations
The ESA’s third powerful tool is the designation of critical
habitat, required either with the listing decision or, if “not then
determinable,” within one year thereafter “to the maximum ex-
tent prudent.”61  Conservation of critical habitat has always been
one of the Act’s primary purposes.62  However, critical habitat
has still only been designated for a minority of the total species
currently listed, and failure to designate critical habitat is also a
frequent source of ESA litigation.63
Biologically, protecting species requires protecting their
habitat.  Two recent studies have shown that ESA-listed species
with designated critical habitats are far more likely to recover
than species without.64  Measures to avoid “adverse modification
59 See WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 77.85.005-.230 (West 2007); see also supra  note
19 and accompanying text. R
60 Forestry practices in all three states have been assessed independently by scien-
tists and found to be insufficient to prevent further salmonid extinctions. See INDEP.
MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCI. TEAM, TECHNICAL REPORT 1999-1, RECOVERY OF WILD
SALMONIDS IN WESTERN OREGON FORESTS: OREGON FOREST PRACTICES ACT
RULES AND MEASURES IN THE OREGON PLAN FOR SALMON AND WATERSHEDS 39-
40 (1999), available at  http://www.fsl.orst.edu/imst/reports/1999-1.pdf; FRANK LIGON
ET AL., REPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVIEW PANEL ON CALIFORNIA FOREST PRAC-
TICE RULES AND SALMONID HABITAT 15 (1999), available at  http://resources.ca.gov/
SRP_Rept.pdf; Am. Fisheries Soc’y & Soc’y for Ecological Restoration, Review of
the 29 April 1999 “Forests and Fish Report” and of Associated “Draft Emergency
Forest Practice Rules” 2 (2000) (on file with author).
61 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) (2006).
62 See id.  §§ 1531(b), 1532(3), 1536(a)(2).
63 See  Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1181 (D. Ariz.
2003); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Endangered Species Act “Bro-
ken”—Flood of Litigation over Critical Habitat Hinders Species Conservation (May
28, 2003), available at  http://www.fws.gov/endangered/criticalhabitat/ch_pressre-
lease.pdf.
64 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL’N NO. GAO-03-803, ENDANGERED
SPECIES: FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE USES BEST AVAILABLE SCIENCE TO MAKE
LISTING DECISIONS, BUT ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE NEEDED FOR CRITICAL HABITAT
DESIGNATIONS (2003), available at  http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03803.pdf; Mar-
tin F.J. Taylor et al., The Effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act: A Quantitative
Analysis , 55 BIOSCIENCE 360, 362, 363 fig.3 (2005).
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of critical habitat” are also frequently included in the RPAs rec-
ommended in BiOps.65
However, the past two presidential administrations have con-
sidered initial habitat designations to be duplicative with recov-
ery plans,66 and Congress has systematically slowed the
designation process through inadequate funding.67  The current
Bush administration also has significantly downsized existing
critical-habitat designations, including nineteen for West Coast
salmonids, in friendly settlements of industry-brought lawsuits.68
The Bush administration also has greatly curtailed the ESA list-
ing process itself, with the fewest species listed of any
President.69
The Bush administration also has favored bills in Congress that
would eliminate the mandatory initial critical-habitat designation
process entirely and instead make it part of the recovery plan.70
65 See  5 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2006).
66 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1103 (D. Ariz.
2003).
67 Robert L. Fischman, Predictions and Prescriptions for the Endangered Species
Act , 34 ENVTL. L. 451, 471-72 (2004).
68 See, e.g. , Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. Evans, No. 00-CV-2799, 2002 WL
1205743, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 2002) (approving consent decree to rescind critical
habitat).  The consent decree approved in Evans  rescinded critical habitat for twenty
of the twenty-seven then-listed populations of salmonids on the West Coast.  Desig-
nation of Critical Habitat for Seven ESUs of Pacific Salmon and Steelhead, 69 Fed.
Reg. 71,880, 71,885 (Dec. 10, 2004).  The PCFFA and a coalition of environmental
groups brought suit, alleging that NOAA Fisheries had failed to promptly designate
critical habitat in lieu of the designations rescinded in Evans .  The Agency entered
into a consent decree in which it agreed to a schedule for designating critical habitat.
Id.  The Agency published critical-habitat designations for nineteen of the twenty
salmonid species in 2005.  Designation of Critical Habitat for Seven ESUs of Pacific
Salmon and Steelhead in California, 70 Fed. Reg. 52,488 (Sept. 2, 2005).  One popu-
lation, the Oregon Coast coho, had been judicially delisted in the interim, making
critical-habitat designations moot for that population. See supra  note 56.  For addi- R
tional information regarding efforts by the administration to cut back on critical
salmon-habitat designations, see Earthjustice, Bush Administration Attacks Endan-
gered Species Act,  http://www.earthjustice.org/library/policy_factsheets/CHFact
Sheet.pdf (information sheet) (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).  Critical habitat for Kla-
math coho salmon, part of the Southern Oregon/Northern California Coho
(SONCC) ESU, was designated some time ago and has not been challenged.
69 Janet Wilson & Julie Cart, Species Act Changes in the Works , L.A. TIMES, Mar.
28, 2007, at A17.
70 During the 109th Congress, the administration supported Representative Rich-
ard Pombo’s Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2005.  Rep.
Pombo’s bill passed in the House on September 29, 2005.  Felicity Barringer, House
Votes for New Limits on Endangered Species Act , N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at
A24.  The bill failed to gain Senate approval.  Had the bill become law, it would
have completely eliminated authority of the Secretaries to designate critical habitat
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Unfortunately, there is no deadline for the adoption of recovery
plans under the ESA.71  None of the listed salmonid populations
have recovery plans and it may be many years before those plans
are adopted, so delaying designation of critical habitat until the
recovery-planning stage would likely doom many populations to
little or no habitat protection indefinitely.72
5. Which Prevails: The ESA or State Water Law?
Water projects tend to harm ESA-listed species by blocking
their habitat or by dewatering or dramatically changing the river
systems they depend on for survival.  The survival of an aquatic
species usually depends on the amount of water flowing through
its river system.  Other survival factors, such as water tempera-
ture, dissolved oxygen, and water quality are also hydrologically
related to water flows.73  The Klamath Basin is no exception to
this general rule of physics.
There is no such thing as federal water law.  Traditionally,
water allocation has been regulated by states.  Since the Klamath
Basin spans two states, both Oregon and California laws apply in
various places.  Sometimes those laws conflict, and instream
water needs for fish and wildlife, until recently, were not recog-
nized as a legitimate beneficial use of state waters.74
prior to adoption of a recovery plan. See  Threatened and Endangered Species Re-
covery Act of 2005, H.R. 3824, 109th Cong. § 5 (as passed by House, Sept. 29, 2005).
71 See  16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1) (2006).
72 Some salmonid populations have been listed since 1988, but still have no recov-
ery plans.  For current information about NOAA Fisheries’ salmon recovery-plan-
ning process, see Northwest. Regional Office, ESA Recovery Plans, http://www.nwr.
noaa.gov/Salmon-Recovery-Planning/ESA-Recovery-Plans/Index.cfm (last visited
Apr. 10, 2007).
73 For instance, when a river’s net flows are reduced, the smaller volume of water
passing more slowly through the system tends to absorb more sunlight, getting much
hotter much faster and staying hot longer.  Reservoirs behind dams also tend to
absorb sunlight as well as concentrate nutrients, resulting in water-quality deteriora-
tion.  The capacity of water to retain the dissolved oxygen fish need to survive is also
inversely proportional to temperature, which means the hotter the water, the less
dissolved oxygen it can retain.  Warmer water also encourages fish pathogens and
warm-water predators of salmonids.  All these factors can combine to make western
rivers unsuitable for salmonids, which are evolved for cold, well-oxygenated water
conditions generally lower than 20°C (68°F).
74 Instream water rights intended to retain water in-river for fish and wildlife
needs have been recognized as a legitimate beneficial use in California by statute
since at least 1933 in California Fish and Game Code § 525 and its successor, Fish
and Game Code § 5937. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5937 (West 2007).  Similar
legislation was not enacted in Oregon until 1987. See OR. REV. STAT. § 537.332
(2005).
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However, there are a number of relatively new western state
water laws that do protect instream water for aquatic species to
some degree.75  Unfortunately, many of these state programs are
flawed, underfunded, or rarely enforced.76  Since many basins are
already over-appropriated, instream water rights (which are al-
ways junior in time to pre-existing senior water rights) are virtu-
ally meaningless.
However, when the ESA constrains water supplies to conserve
a listed species, these federally imposed constraints often conflict
with state water-allocation laws, leading to federal preemption.
The legal boundaries between the ESA and state water law are
still in flux.  There is considerable litigation on these issues, par-
ticularly in the Klamath Basin.
Significantly, the ESA itself does not defer to state water-
rights law and contains only the vague statement that it is “the
policy of Congress that Federal agencies shall cooperate with
State and local agencies to resolve water resource issues in con-
cert with conservation of endangered species.”77  It is therefore
unlikely that a deference to state water laws will ever be interpo-
lated into the ESA.  The stronger deference to state water law in
the Clean Water Act (CWA) has not been enough to eliminate
federal obligations to provide water for ESA-listed species.78
Thus, in considering the same problem under the ESA, the court
in Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District  held:
This provision does not require, however, that state water
rights should prevail over the restrictions set forth in the Act.
Such an interpretation would render the Act a nullity.  The
Act provides no exemption from compliance to persons pos-
sessing state water rights, and thus the District’s state water
75 See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5937; CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1243, 1257, 1707
(West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.332; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.22.010,
90.54.020(3)(a) (West 2007).
76 Jack Sterne, Instream Rights & Invisible Hands: Prospects for Private Instream
Water Rights in the Northwest , 27 ENVTL. L. 207, 215-20 (1997); see generally  Jesse
A. Boyd, Student Writing, Hip Deep: A Survey of Instream Flow Law from the
Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean , 43 NAT. RES. 1151 (2003) (providing a survey
of Western instream-flow law).  As of 1995, Oregon had a backlog of close to 1000
instream water rights applications but had granted only thirty-six. BOTKIN ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 102.
77 See  16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2) (2006).
78 See  Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir. 1985).
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rights do not provide it with a special privilege to ignore the
Endangered Species Act.79
In another important West Coast water case also arising from
the California Central Valley, Carson-Truckee Water Conser-
vancy District v. Watt , the Secretary of the Interior ordered
changes in operations at a federal reservoir to benefit an ESA-
listed fish far downstream, an action challenged by water users.
The court ruled that the Department of the Interior (DOI) was
“required to give the [endangered species] priority over all other
purposes” of the project but that any water “not required under
the [ESA]” must be stored for the water users.80  On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit expanded the ruling to hold that not only could the
Bureau of Reclamation use water necessary to prevent jeopardy,
but it could also, absent specific contractual water obligations,
devote whatever water resources it had within its discretion to-
ward lower-river endangered-species protections.81  However,
that case did not answer whether the ESA would supersede spe-
cific water contracts, because no such contracts were at issue.
In a later Ninth Circuit case, O’Neill v. United States , among
other issues the court considered the issue of conflict more
squarely, and ruled that the federal government was relieved
from federal water-contract obligations to the extent that the
water was required to prevent jeopardy to the ESA-listed winter-
run Chinook.82  The Ninth Circuit later expanded on  this view in
an important Klamath Basin water case over ESA-listed coho,
ruling that even though federal water contracts based on state
water laws may have existed prior to the ESA, subsequent ESA
legislation requiring changes in water-contract allocations to
meet listed-species’ survival needs prevails over those prior irri-
gation contracts.83  Specifically that court said:
It is well settled that contractual arrangements can be altered
by subsequent Congressional legislation.  The ESA was en-
acted in 1973 to “halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction, whatever the cost.”  Even in circumstances where
the ESA was passed well after the agreement, the legislation
79 United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (E.D.
Cal. 1992).
80 Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Watt, 549 F. Supp. 704, 710 (D.
Nev. 1982).
81 Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984).
82 O’Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 689 (9th Cir. 1995).
83 Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th
Cir. 1999).
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still applies as long as the federal agency retains some measure
of control over the activity.  Therefore, when an agency, such
as Reclamation, decides to take action, the ESA generally ap-
plies to the contract.
Because Reclamation retains authority to manage the Dam,
and because it remains the owner in fee simple of the Dam, it
has responsibilities under the ESA as a federal agency. These
responsibilities include taking control of the Dam when neces-
sary to meet the requirements of the ESA, requirements that
override the water rights of the Irrigators .84
The court also noted that tribal treaty obligations, which in the
Klamath include rights to sufficient water retained in the river
and lakes to protect subsistence fisheries, also supersede the con-
tractual rights of irrigators:
Similar to its duties under the ESA, the United States, as a
trustee for the Tribes, has a responsibility to protect their
rights and resources. . . .
. . .  Because Reclamation maintains control of the Dam, it
has a responsibility to divert the water and resources needed
to fulfill the Tribes’ rights, rights that take precedence over
any alleged rights of the Irrigators.85
It appears that at least in the Ninth Circuit both ESA-related
water needs for listed species and tribal water rights take prece-
dence over federal water contracts supported by state water law.
This precedent was later applied in the Klamath Basin in the
well-known case Kandra v. United States .  In Kandra , the district
court rejected Project irrigators’ arguments that minimum river-
flow mitigation measures that curtailed irrigation deliveries to
benefit ESA-listed fish could not be implemented because they
were inconsistent with the primary irrigation mission of the
Project.86
84 Id.  (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
85 Id.  at 1213-14.  The issue of tribal water rights in the Klamath Basin is a com-
plex one outside the scope of this Article.  However, each of the four major tribes in
the Klamath Basin (the Klamath Tribes in the Upper Basin, and the Yurok, Hoopa,
and Karuk in the Lower Basin) have a basis, either by treaty, federal statute, or by
implication from federal trust obligations, to require the federal government to pro-
vide sufficient water in the river to maintain subsistence tribal fisheries.  In addition,
the Upper Basin Klamath Tribes have the most senior water right in the Basin, dat-
ing from “time immemorial,” which has not yet been adjudicated as to amount.
United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414-15 (9th Cir. 1983).  A comprehensive
and complex Oregon water-rights adjudication process has been ongoing in the Up-
per Basin for more than two decades.  Reed D. Benson, Giving Suckers (and
Salmon) an Even Break: Klamath Water Basin and the Endangered Species Act , 15
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 197, 210 (2002).
86 Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp.2d 1192, 1207 (D. Or. 2001).
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In a 1995 Memorandum specifically addressing Project opera-
tions, the Regional Solicitor’s Office of the DOI expressed the
same view with respect to tribal water rights:
Reclamation has an obligation to deliver water to the project
water users . . . subject to the availability of water. . . .  Water
would not be available, for example, due to drought, a need to
forego diversions to satisfy prior existing rights, or compliance
with other federal laws such as the Endangered Species Act.87
These cases and opinions do not answer the question of what
might happen if specific legislation  gives the Bureau no discretion
over irrigation-water deliveries.  The ESA consultation require-
ments of section 7 may apply only to discretionary actions.  This
is the reason the Bureau has asserted repeatedly that providing
water for ESA-listed species is a discretionary act that would be
inconsistent with its statutory (i.e., nondiscretionary) mission to
maximize irrigation-water deliveries.88  However, in Pacific Coast
Federation of Fishermen’s Associations  (PCFFA I), the Bureau
had been enjoined for ignoring its section 7 consultation obliga-
tion for the Project.89  The Bureau was ordered to re-consult with
87 Memorandum from Regional Solicitor, Pac. Sw. Region, U.S. Dep’t of the Inte-
rior to Regional Director, Mid-Pac. Region, Bureau of Reclamation 7 (July 25, 1995)
(on file with author) (internal citations omitted); see also  Memorandum from the
Regional Solicitor, Pac. Sw. Region, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior & Regional Solicitor,
Pac. Nw. Region, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior to the Regional Director, U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv. et al. 2 (Jan. 9, 1997) (on file with author) (confirming the opinion
contained in the July 25, 1995 memorandum).
88 KLAMATH BASIN AREA OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL BIOLOGI-
CAL ASSESSMENT ON THE EFFECTS OF PROPOSED ACTIONS RELATED TO KLAMATH
PROJECT OPERATION (APRIL 1, 2002–MARCH 31, 2003) ON FEDERALLY-LISTED
THREATENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES 4 (2002), available at  http://www.usbr.
gov/mp/kbao/docs/Final_Biological_Assessment_02-25-02.pdf (“Reclamation has an
obligation to deliver water to the Project water users in accordance with the Project
water rights and contracts. . . .”); id.  at 8 (“Whether undertaken as section 7(a)(1)
conservation activities or as RPAs . . . any Reclamation action for endangered spe-
cies purposes must be within the agency’s existing authority. . . .  Reclamation’s fail-
ure to take an action that is conceivably within its authorities cannot be determined
to be a cause of ‘jeopardy.’”).  This position is contrary to existing case law. See
Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir.
1996).
89 Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 138 F.
Supp. 2d 1228, 1248-49 (N.D. Cal. 2001).  This was the first of two major Klamath
water cases brought by the PCFFA against the Bureau for its refusal to consult
under section 7 for 2000, during which it operated the Project without a NOAA
Fisheries BiOp.
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the Services, and was enjoined from making further water deliv-
eries to the Project until it prepared the 2001 BiOp.90
The federal courts would likely take a dim view of Bureau ef-
forts to completely and unilaterally exempt itself from ESA sec-
tion 7 consultation requirements,91 particularly since the Bureau
maintains wide discretion over both the amounts and timing of
whatever water it delivers.
Another problem with the Bureau’s ESA consultation theory
is that even if it were true that it lacked legal discretion to meet
ESA water requirements, although section 7 might no longer ap-
ply, the ESA’s section 9 take prohibitions most certainly still
would, thus exposing the federal government (and potentially its
irrigation clients) to considerable ESA liability.
In addition, since ESA and tribal trust water obligations are on
a similar par, and both are prior in right to irrigation contract
deliveries under Klamath Water Users , the government would
have to claim an equivalent lack of discretion to meet tribal trust
water needs.  This would expose the government to massive tri-
bal lawsuits for breach of its fiduciary duties as trustee.  Thus, the
Bureau’s position that it lacks legal discretion to comply with
non-irrigation water obligations under either the ESA or tribal
trust obligations is wholly untenable.  In the Ninth Circuit, the
Bureau clearly has both ESA and tribal trust obligations it can-
not ignore, and Klamath Water Users  and O’Neill  remain con-
trolling case law.92
90 Id.  at 1249-50.
91 See id.  at 1243.
92 A similar issue arose recently in the Tenth Circuit case Rio Grande Silvery Min-
now v . Keys .  There a three-judge panel adopted Patterson , holding that the Bureau
did indeed have discretion to modify federal irrigation contracts when needed to
supply water for the survival of the ESA-listed silvery minnow.  333 F.3d 1109, 1157
(10th Cir. 2003), vacated , 355 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004).  The ruling provoked a
political firestorm in New Mexico, and ultimately resulted in a rare congressional
override of the ESA that forbade such water diversions for at least two years.  En-
ergy & Water Development Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-137, § 208,
117 Stat. 1827, 1849 (2003).  Oddly enough, after all the controversy, the Bureau
never had to exercise that authority.  The issue was legally moot and the prior ruling
was later vacated. Keys , 355 F.3d at 1222.  The Ninth Circuit remains the only cir-
cuit that has clearly delineated the relationship between ESA water needs and irri-
gation water contracts.  The law is still unsettled in most other areas of the country.
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6. ESA Liability of Non-Federal Governmental Entities
All the above cases involved a federal nexus (i.e., water opera-
tions by the Bureau, even though the Bureau’s actions were in
part based on state water laws).  Whether non -federal govern-
mental agencies can become liable under the ESA for a take that
it authorizes or condones is still an open question in the Ninth
Circuit.  However, a growing line of cases, derived from the
landmark case Strahan v. Coxe ,93 strongly implies that they can.
Furthermore, at least one case in the Ninth Circuit, Palila v. Ha-
waii Department of Land & Water Resources , found indirect state
take liability by holding a Hawaii state agency liable for main-
taining herds of sheep and goats to the detriment of Hawaii’s
ESA-listed palila bird.94
The implications flowing from the Strahan line of cases (i.e.,
holding state agencies liable for take under section 9 of the ESA)
were recently tested in Pacific Rivers Council v. Brown .95  The
plaintiffs in that case (which included the PCFFA) alleged that
the State Forester and the Oregon Board of Forestry authorized
logging operations on high-risk, landslide-prone slopes that
caused landslides in spawning and rearing streams.  The plaintiffs
claimed these landslides caused silt build-up in streams and de-
stroyed critical habitat, and thereby resulted in a substantial take
of ESA-listed Oregon coho salmon.96
The district court ruled on summary judgment that the Strahan
theory of liability would apply to the Board of Forestry and to
the State Forester.97  However, the case never went to trial be-
cause, shortly thereafter, the Oregon Coast coho was judicially
delisted in Alsea Valley Alliance  on different grounds.98  That
93 Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d. 155 (1st Cir. 1997); see also  Loggerhead Turtle v.
County Council of Volusia County, 148 F.3d 1231, 1253 (11th Cir. 1998) (following
Strahan  in finding similar ESA take liability for a non-federal government entity);
United States v. Town of Plymouth, 6 F. Supp. 2d 81, 90 (D. Mass. 1998) (same).
94 See  Palila v. Haw. Dep’t. of Land & Water Res., 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1082-83 (D.
Haw. 1986).
95 Pac. Rivers Council v. Brown, No. CV-02-243-BR, 2004 WL 2091471 (D. Or.
Sept. 17, 2004).
96 First Amended Complaint at 17-20, Pac. Rivers Council v. Brown, No. CV-02-
243-BR, 2004 WL 2091471 (D. Or. Sept. 17, 2004), 2003 WL 24058050.
97 Pac. Rivers Council v. Brown, No. CV-02-243-BR (D. Or. Dec. 23, 2002) (order
denying defendant’s motion to dismiss).
98 See supra  note 56. R
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population has not yet been relisted.99  In fear of Strahan  liabil-
ity, the Oregon legislature has also since changed state law, at the
request of Oregon’s Board of Forestry and Attorney General, to
eliminate all discretionary authority by the State Forester to ap-
prove or disapprove logging plans.100
Pacific Rivers Council was then dismissed as moot and the
question of whether Strahan -type liability applies to state agen-
cies in the Ninth Circuit remains unclear.101
Local and regional governmental entities, such as local water
districts, also face similar ESA liability but would not have avail-
able the state’s defense of sovereign immunity under the Elev-
enth Amendment.102  Where there are ESA-listed fish involved,
the threat of such ESA take liability can become a powerful tool
for securing needed water reforms.  For instance, an ESA section
9 take suit was filed by NOAA Fisheries against the Grants Pass
Irrigation District in 1998, alleging a take caused by the District’s
Savage Rapids Dam on the Rogue River.103  Poor fish passage at
that dam has nearly destroyed a salmonid fishery with a value
99 When NOAA Fisheries re-listed numerous salmonid populations after making
policy changes required by the Alsea Valley Alliance  court, NOAA Fisheries did not
re-list the Oregon Coast coho, in part because of another deal worked out with the
State of Oregon.  Once again the agency relied on the proposed future measures
under the Oregon Plan (this time under the new PECE policy), but also relying on
an internal Oregon “viability analysis” that has been much criticized by biologists as
simply de facto defining a severely depressed population as viable. See  Withdrawal
of Proposals to List and Designate Critical Habitat for the Oregon Coast Coho
ESU, 71 Fed. Reg. 3033, 3035-36 (Jan. 19, 2006).  That second non-listing decision
has since been challenged in Trout Unlimited v. Lohn . See supra  note 56.  The end R
result of the non-listing decision for the Oregon Coast coho, as feared by conserva-
tionists, is that some land-use activities (particularly federal-lands logging) that
would not have gone forward under the prior Oregon Coast coho ESA listing are
now going forward anyway, severely undercutting other landowner efforts under the
Oregon Plan to restore this depressed stock.
100 See OR. REV. STAT. § 527.674 (2005).  Thus, Oregon law no longer permits
State Forester or Board of Forestry pre-approvals of most logging plans. Id.  This is
clearly a weakening of Oregon’s already relatively weak controls over forestry im-
pacts to salmonid-bearing streams, adopted specifically to avoid Strahan .
101 While affirmative actions by an agency creating take might be liable under
Strahan , it is far less certain that there would be such liability for an agency’s failure
to exercise its discretionary regulatory authority to prevent  take under section 9 of
the ESA that it had reason to know would occur.  These are all fertile areas for
litigation.
102 Sovereign immunity is a judicial doctrine that prevents a government from
being sued without its consent, in this case a state entity being sued in federal courts.
9 WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 313 (1998).
103 See Complaint, United States v. Grants Pass Irrigation Dist., No. 98-3034-HO
(D. Or. Aug. 27, 2001).
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estimated by the Bureau in 1995 at $5 million per year to the
local economy.104  The legal risk of ESA liability for those ongo-
ing actions was a compelling threat to the District that ultimately
resulted in settlement of the case, which in turn will soon lead to
the decommissioning and removal of the ninety-year-old Savage
Rapids Dam and restoration of salmon passage through that por-
tion of the Rogue River.105
The ESA would also apply to private water users whose other-
wise legal water diversions result in a take under the ESA.  But,
because of the difficulty of such litigation against private parties,
fears of such lawsuits have been far more pervasive than actual
lawsuits.  Nevertheless, the ESA provides for a third-party citi-
zen suit right of action to enjoin any person (including, but not
limited to, the government) from violating the ESA or any of its
regulations.106
Citizen take suits against private landowners (as opposed to
government agencies) are apparently rare as well as difficult to
win.  The only systematic effort to use this tool known to the au-
thor has been by the Idaho-based Western Watersheds Project.
In October 2000, the group sent more than fifty letters to various
Idaho ranchers notifying them of its intent to sue them under the
ESA citizen-suit provisions, claiming that these ranchers’ water
diversions were harming salmon, steelhead, and bull trout habitat
in violation of the ESA by trapping fish in ditches, blocking mi-
gration, and completely dewatering parts of some streams.107
104 A 1995 report estimated that removal of Savage Rapids Dam would result in
“[s]almon and steelhead escapement at Savage Rapids is estimated to increase about
22 percent.” BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, DRAFT EN-
VIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR FISH PASSAGE IMPROVEMENTS OF SAVAGE
RAPIDS DAM 45-46 (2005), available at  http://www.usbr.gov/pn/programs/ea/oregon/
savage/draftea_SRD.pdf.  Such an increase would represent an additional $5 million
in fisheries value to the local sport- and commercial-fishing economy.  Eric Gorski,
New Task Force Will Study Savage Rapids Dam , OREGONIAN (Portland), Aug. 11,
1995, at B2.
105 State Approves Grant to Remove Dam , OREGONIAN (Portland), Jan. 14, 2002,
at B7.
106 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006).
107 IWP and CIHD File First ESA Lawsuits Against Ranchers Over Water Diver-
sions in Upper Salmon River Watershed , WATERSHEDS MESSENGER (Western Wa-
tersheds Project, Hailey, Idaho), Winter 2001, at 3, available at  http://www.western
watersheds.org/watmess/watmess_2001/winter_2001.pdf.  Only a few of these law-
suits were ultimately filed.
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7. Takings v. Takings: When Are ESA Water Protections
Compensable?
In accordance with Klamath Water Users and O’Neill , the
ESA, at least in the Ninth Circuit, clearly prevails over pre-ex-
isting water rights and water contracts wherever there is a direct
conflict.  Thus the Bureau must withhold water from irrigation
even in the face of valid, pre-existing water rights and water-de-
livery contracts, whenever required to do so to prevent jeopardy
of ESA-protected species.  This outcome has been much criti-
cized by water-right holders as an infringement of private prop-
erty rights.  But in this context the ESA does not so much
prevent the exercise of private property rights as it protects pub-
lic property rights: the fish and wildlife resources held in com-
mon in public trust for the good of society as a whole.  Since the
Codex Justinianus  was adopted in 529, private property rights
have been bounded and superseded by public trust obligations.108
The ESA is simply one embodiment of the long-standing legal
principle that there is no absolute right to destroy public prop-
erty, any more than there is an absolute right to use one’s own
property in ways that destroy the property rights of others.
Nevertheless, the dynamic tension between the prohibitions
against takings of private property for public benefit embodied in
the Fifth Amendment, and taking by individuals under the ESA
by actions threatening extinction of public property embodied in
fish and wildlife resources, presents fertile ground for lawsuits
pitting public interests against private interests.
a. The Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District Takings
Case Precedent
In December 2003, the Court of Federal Claims for the first
time awarded monetary damages to federal water-contract irriga-
tors who claimed that diversion of a portion of their anticipated
irrigation water in 1992–94 was a taking of private property (i.e.,
water rights) under the Fifth Amendment.  The water was di-
verted by the Bureau to meet the survival needs of endangered
winter-run Chinook and delta smelt, and to keep these ESA-
listed fish from being sucked into pumps and irrigation canals
where large numbers were dying.  In a ruling that will have a
108 See J. INST. 2.1.2 (reprinted in 2 S.P. SCOTT, THE CIVIL LAW 35 (AMS 1973)
(1932)).
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chilling effect on the enforcement of future federal water-protec-
tion measures for species listed under the ESA, the court in Tu-
lare Lake Basin Water Storage District ruled that nearly $14
million in damages plus interest (more than $26 million total)
was due to the farmers for the lost water.109
The large 2003 damages award, however, was not unexpected.
In the earlier, merits phase of the case, the court said, “The fed-
eral government is certainly free to preserve the fish; it must sim-
ply pay for the water it takes to do so.”110  That ruling has been
criticized as far too broad,111 and also was apparently decided
without reference to Ninth Circuit cases such as O’Neill, Klamath
Water Users , and Kandra , none of which are cited in the ruling.
Thus, Tulare  also represents a growing schism between the
Ninth Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims over how to rec-
oncile the ESA and the Fifth Amendment in federal irrigation
water-contract disputes.  However, Tulare  is likely also limited to
the specific facts of that case, which included unusual provisions
in the federal irrigation contracts at issue containing specific vol-
ume promises of water to be provided.112  Most other federal
water contracts, and in particular those within the Klamath Pro-
ject, do not have these types of specific allocation provisions.
b. Klamath Irrigation District v. United States Takings Claim
Rejected
The first big test of the Tulare  decision’s applicability came in a
similar Klamath Basin case, Klamath Irrigation District v. United
States , before a different judge.113  In that case, Project farmers
initially claimed up to $1 billion in damages resulting from an
109 Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 246, 266
(2003).  The United States eventually settled the case for $16.7 million.  Bettina Box-
all, U.S. to Pay $16 Million in Water Rights Case , L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2004, at B1.
110 Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 324
(2001).
111 See, e.g. , Melinda Harm Benson, The  Tulare Case: Water Rights, the Endan-
gered Species Act, and the Fifth Amendment , 32 ENVTL. L. 551, 551 (2002); Cori S.
Parobek, Note, Of Farmers’ Takes and Fishes’ Takings: Fifth Amendment Compensa-
tion Claims When the Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights Collide , 27
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 212-16 (2003).
112 See Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. , 49 Fed. Cl. at 320-21 (distinguishing
O’Neill).
113 Klamath Irrigation District was argued before Judge Francis M. Allegra.  In a
very rare event, the PCFFA, even though not a government contractee, was never-
theless allowed to intervene based on its real economic interests in fisheries protec-
tion that resulted from the 2001 water decision.
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alleged unconstitutional reallocation of Project irrigation water
to meet basic survival needs of lower Klamath River ESA-listed
coho as a result of the 2001 BiOps and near-record drought.114
The year 2001 was the first time in more than ninety years,
including through numerous prior droughts, that irrigation water
to the Project was ordered curtailed to protect ESA-listed fish.115
This decision, made early in the Bush administration, was made
inevitable by both minimum lake-level water needs of ESA-listed
resident sucker fish in Upper Klamath Lake and in-river mini-
mum flow needs of ESA-listed coho in the Lower Klamath below
Iron Gate Dam, coupled with serious drought.116  Naturally it
caused a political firestorm in the upper Basin among the several
hundred Project-dependent irrigators whose water deliveries
were curtailed or delayed.117
The first threshold issue raised in Klamath Irrigation District
was whether irrigators receiving water from the Project had a
compensable water right.118  However, it was ruled early on that
the Bureau, and not its client-irrigators, holds all water rights of
114 Michael Milstein, Lawsuit Against Government Will Seek Up to $1 Billion in
Klamath Basin Fight , OREGONIAN (Portland), Aug. 25, 2001, at D1.  The plaintiffs
later reduced their damages claim.  Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 75
Fed. Cl. 677, 682 (2007).
115 Michael Milstein, Klamath Farms Left Without Water , OREGONIAN (Portland),
Apr. 7, 2001, at A1.  In years prior to 2001, Klamath Project irrigators actually got
more water during drought years than during normal rainfall years, on the theory
that irrigation demand was greater with less soil moisture from rainfall, exacerbating
drought shortfalls to the lower river.  Prior to the ESA listings of these fish, the only
constraints on flows below Iron Gate Dam and into the salmon-bearing lower river
were minimum flow requirements of the PacifiCorp FERC license for its in-river
Klamath Hydroelectric Project power dams which, since the Bureau of Reclamation
ultimately controls upper-river flows but is not bound by PacifiCorp’s FERC license
requirements, were often ignored by the Bureau when irrigation needs could not
otherwise be met.
116 Id.
117 Upper Klamath Basin protest rallies and symbolic acts of civil disobedience to
turn on irrigation deliveries ensued, with much publicity aimed at the water curtail-
ments as abuses of the ESA.  The 2001 Klamath irrigation cutoffs are still cited by
some members of Congress as one reason the ESA should be substantially amended
to exclude impacts on federal water projects, and several such bills were introduced
in Congress. See supra  note 70.  However, only Project deliveries from Upper Kla- R
math Lake were affected in 2001.  The effects of these curtailments were not uni-
form, with few instances of total water cutoffs that season.  For a thorough and
objective analysis of the events of 2001 in the upper Klamath Basin, see Jaeger,
supra  note 34, at 265-82. R
118 A legal prerequisite for any Fifth Amendment claim based on a taking of a
property right is that such a property right actually exists.  Karuk Tribe of California
v. Ammon, 209 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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the Project, with the rights of its client-irrigators created only by
contract and not by formal water rights.119  On that basis, Judge
Allegra sharply disagreed with applying the prior Tulare  ruling
and found no compensable property right in water held by either
the irrigation districts or the plaintiff-irrigators, ruling that their
only remedy was in contract law.120
The court also noted that these separate irrigator contract
claims are unlikely to prevail because, unlike in Tulare , the Kla-
math Project contracts, like most federal irrigation-delivery con-
tracts, do not provide guarantees of any specific water amount,
but only whatever amounts are available after meeting other
prior obligations, which can include prior ESA-related water al-
locations for fish and wildlife.121  Judge Allegra also took sharp
exception to Tulare  itself, commenting that Tulare  was “wrong
on some counts” and should be limited to the very different and
unique facts in that case.122
Additionally, Klamath Project farmers would have a tough
time showing any actual damages, as most of the estimated $36.5
million in actual crop losses have since been mitigated by various
federal disaster- and drought-relief programs.123
On March 16, 2007, the last of the remaining contract claims in
Klamath Irrigation District  were indeed dismissed as pre-
dicted,124 and as of this writing plaintiffs are likely to appeal.  If
so, the opposing rulings of Tulare  and Klamath Irrigation District
may eventually be reconciled by the Supreme Court.125
119 Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 523-31 (2005).  That
Project irrigators hold only contract rights was later confirmed by the Oregon Kla-
math Basin Adjudication.  Interim Order at 16, In re  Adjudication of Relative
Rights of the Klamath River, No. 003 (Or. Water Res. Dep’t Jan. 12, 2006).
120 Klamath Irrigation Dist. , 67 Fed. Cl. at 540.
121 Id.  at 535-36, 538.
122 Id . at 537-38.
123 Jaeger, supra  note 34, at 265-83. The $36.5 million figure represents the me- R
dian between a high estimate of $46 million and a low estimate of $27 million.
124 Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 677 (2007).
125 The government did not appeal Tulare , for fear of setting a broader precedent.
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C. Shuffling Toward Recovery: Unresolved Salmon and ESA
Water Dilemmas
Above all, the ESA mandates efforts at species recovery.
NOAA Fisheries is now working to chart out that recovery path
for the listed salmonid runs of the West Coast.126
Recent congressional action gives the development of a recov-
ery plan for Klamath Basin coho great urgency.  The Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization
Act, signed by the President on January 12, 2007, provides for a
special recovery plan for Klamath coho salmon that must be
completed and submitted to Congress within six months of the
signing of that Act, followed by annual reports to Congress on
the progress of recovery plan implementation starting two years
after signing.127
Unfortunately, the ESA gives little practical guidance as to
how recovery plans must be constructed or what they must con-
tain, and provides no deadlines for producing such plans.128
Creating the Technical Review Teams and determining what
biological criteria need to be met in each recovery plan is a mon-
umental task requiring resolution of a number of still-unresolved
scientific and policy questions.  Federal funding is usually grossly
insufficient to create or implement such plans, and weak state
environmental laws and lack of state funding to implement such
plans remain serious barriers to delegation of recovery efforts to
the states.
Some of the unresolved problems and issues that impact future
recovery planning both in the Klamath and elsewhere include
those below.
126 None of the populations of West Coast salmonids currently ESA-listed have
ESA recovery plans, though some are under development.  For a summary of cur-
rent NOAA Fisheries West Coast salmonid recovery plan efforts see Northwest Re-
gional Office, ESA Salmon Recovery Plans, http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/Salmon-
Recovery-Planning/ESA-Recovery-Plans/Index.cfm (last visited May 4, 2007).
127 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-479, sec. 113, § 315(d), 120 Stat. 3575, 3602 (codified at
16 U.S.C.A. § 460ss note (West 2007)).
128 The ESA recovery planning process is governed by the sketchy provisions of
16 U.S.C. § 1533(f), but no definition of the word “recovery” appears in the Act’s
definitions contained in 16 U.S.C. § 1532.
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1. Hatchery Impacts on Wild Fish
Biologists are increasingly documenting negative impacts on
wild salmonid populations caused by poorly planned or poorly
managed hatcheries.129   Oregon’s Native Fish Conservation Pol-
icy goes partway toward mitigating those impacts, as does the re-
cent NOAA Fisheries ESA requirement of hatchery genetic
conservation plans.130  Nevertheless, biologists are increasingly of
the opinion that hatchery stocks should not be considered an ad-
equate replacement for healthy, viable populations of wild
salmonids.131
In September 2001, however, Alsea Valley Alliance  resulted in
an unprecedented judicial delisting of the entire Oregon Coast
coho population.132 Alsea Valley Alliance  was based on asser-
tions that there is no legal difference under the ESA between
hatchery-origin and wild salmonids, and that because they are
“genetically and biologically identical,” they should be consid-
ered identical and lumped together by NOAA Fisheries in mak-
ing ESA listing decisions.133  Proponents of this theory, mostly
landowners and irrigation districts, hope that since any number
of hatchery fish could be produced at will with enough hatcher-
ies, lumping them all as part of the same population would lead
to widespread delisting of wild populations—and thus a wide-
spread elimination of ESA-driven habitat protections and water
reforms.134
129 See JIM LICHATOWICH, SALMON WITHOUT RIVERS 207-21 (1999).
130 OR. ADMIN. R. 635-007-0502 to 635-007-0509 (2007).
131 There is considerable scientific evidence that the reproductive success of
hatchery fish is far less than that of wild salmonids. E.g ., Hitoshi Araki et al., Re-
productive Success of Captive-Bred Steelhead Trout in the Wild: Evaluation of Three
Hatchery Programs in the Hood River , 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 181, 186 (2007)
(showing distinct survival deficits in hatchery as opposed to wild steelhead).
132 See  Alsea Valley Alliance v. Evans, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (D. Or. 2001), appeal
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction , 358 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2004). Alsea Valley Alli-
ance  has since spawned numerous look-alike cases.  One such case, California State
Grange v. Evans , resulted in a victory for the plaintiffs.  However, unlike in Alsea
Valley Alliance , no judicial delisting was ordered.  Instead, the court deferred to
NOAA Fisheries’ efforts to correct the analysis flaw on which the Alsea Valley Alli-
ance  case was based. See  Cal. State Grange v. Evans, No. 02-6044-HO (D. Or. Jan.
20, 2005); Dan Bacher, Editorial, Klamath Basin Farmers Win Technical Victory But
Coho Listing Stays , FISH SNIFFER, Feb. 14, 2005, http://www.fishsniffer.com/
dbachere/050214klamath.html.
133 Alsea Valley Alliance , 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1159.
134 This is an ESA deregulation strategy first pioneered in 2001 by long-time
Northwest timber company attorney Mark Rutzick, who represented the timber in-
dustry in many ESA-related cases, then joined the Bush administration in 2003 as
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In June 2005, however, NOAA Fisheries adopted a revised
policy for assessing the biological impact of hatchery components
intermingled with wild runs, and in almost every instance con-
cluded that the prior listings were warranted regardless of hatch-
ery impacts.135  NOAA Fisheries also acknowledges in that policy
that hatchery runs can, and in some cases have, worked to the
detriment of wild run survival in various ways.136
Nevertheless, the Alsea Valley Alliance  delisting precedent has
now become the hope of every agricultural and industry group
seeking to delist salmonid populations entirely.137
2. When Is a Rebound Sufficient to Delist?
Listing was intended to lead to recovery, but because annual
salmon runs have considerable natural variation it is unclear how
large and how sustained higher returns need to be to qualify as a
recovery sufficient to delist.  Recent higher salmon returns in
several rivers appear to be due almost entirely to unusually
favorable ocean-survival conditions, not to any recent efforts
made to restore damaged salmonid habitat.  Chinook, for in-
stance, typically have a four- to five-year life cycle, so harvestable
adult returns this year are mostly from juveniles that hatched or
went out to sea in 2003 through 2004, well before many of the
measures of the Oregon Salmon Plan or other state-based resto-
one of its top salmon-policy advisors.  Timothy Egan, Shift on Salmon Reignites
Fight on Species Law , N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2004, § 1, at 1; see also JAMES BUCHAL,
THE GREAT SALMON HOAX 131-51 (1998) (discussing hatcheries as a potential ave-
nue in avoiding salmon extinction); Press Release, James L. Buchal, NMFS Releases
Anti-Hatchery, Anti-Law Policy (Aug. 6, 2002), http://www.buchal.com/salmon/
news/nf67.htm (“[I]f one takes account of hatchery fish in assessing extinction risk,
there are no endangered salmon in the Pacific Northwest.”).
135 Policy on Consideration of Hatchery-Origin Fish in ESA Listing Determina-
tions for Pacific Salmon and Steelhead, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,204 (June 28, 2005).  In Sep-
tember 2005, NOAA Fisheries relisted most of the previously delisted salmonids
after considering hatchery impacts. See  Designation of Critical Habitat for 12 ESUs
of West Coast Salmon and Steelhead in Washington, Oregon, and Idaho, 70 Fed.
Reg. 52,360 (Sept. 2, 2005).
136 Policy on Consideration of Hatchery-Origin Fish in ESA Listing Determina-
tions for Pacific Salmon and Steelhead, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,205.
137 In 2006, industry filed a major action seeking to delist sixteen distinct salmonid
populations, including the Klamath coho.  Alsea Valley Alliance v. Lautenbacker,
No. 06-6093-HO (D. Or. filed May 1, 2006).  This case is known as Alsea II .  On
August 11, 2006, the PCFFA and various other salmon conservation groups were
granted intervenor status. Klamath coho are part of the larger Southern Oregon/
Northern California Coho, which the plaintiffs seek to have delisted. The case has
been briefed and argued and a decision on this case is now pending as of this writing.
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ration efforts really were up and running.138  Positive effects of
habitat restoration take many years—possibly several salmon
generations—to fully materialize.  Also, by perspective, even the
best recent salmon returns are still only a very small fraction of
historic run sizes, with many of the factors that led to their ESA
listing in the first place still in operation.139
Additionally, recovery as defined under the ESA is simply a
large enough and viable enough population to no longer need
ESA protections to prevent extinction.140  This is a much lower
standard than populations sufficiently robust and diverse to allow
commercial fishing.  Harvestable surpluses—not just delisting—
is the ultimate goal of commercial and sport fishing interests and
of tribal governments.
3. Should the States Take Over Recovery Efforts?
Although it sounds good in principle that states, not the fed-
eral government, should be the primary salmon recovery leaders
in restoring their own resources, practical problems with the con-
cept of states taking over salmon protections are numerous.
Weak state laws led to many of the very impacts on salmon that
originally led to their listing, particularly watershed-scale impacts
from industrial-scale forestry and agriculture.141  The respective
California and Oregon forestry rules, for instance, are far less
protective of riparian salmon habitat than recommended by
138 A few pre-mature salmon, called “jacks,” return early as three-year-olds, but
are usually too small for harvest.  These jack counts are the statistical basis for pre-
dictions of the peak returns as four-year-olds.
139 Wild fall Chinook in the Klamath Basin, for instance, are typically now only
about 4%-7% of their historic abundance, with fisheries managers unable even to
make the 35,000 spawner floor, when pre-development populations averaged an es-
timated 880,000 adults. See supra  notes 2-3 and accompanying text. R
140 The ESA does not define the term recovery, but instead uses the term con-
serve, defined as “all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any en-
dangered species or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided
pursuant to this [Act] are no longer necessary.”  16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (2006); see also
id.  § 1533(f)(1) (defining “recovery plans” in terms of “conservation”).
141 See NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., FACTORS FOR DECLINE 14-15 (1996),
available at  http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/ESA-Salmon-Listings/Salmon-Populations/
Reports-and-Publications/upload/stlhd-ffd.pdf; see also NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES
SERV., FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE DECLINE OF WEST COAST CHINOOK
SALMON 5-8 (1998), available at  http://www.nwr.noaa.gov/ESA-Salmon-Listings/
Salmon-Populations/Reports-and-Publications/upload/chnk-ffd.pdf (identifying a va-
riety of factors, including forestry and agriculture, in salmon decline).
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NOAA Fisheries or the Independent Multi-disciplinary Science
Team (IMST) that oversees the Oregon Salmon Plan.142
NOAA Fisheries has long been heavily critical of Oregon’s
Forest Practices Act and its accompanying rules, noting in several
past documents how industrial logging controls in Oregon fail to
meet minimum environmental protection standards needed to
protect ESA-listed salmonids and to promote their recovery.143
The IMST, in assessing the protectiveness of the Oregon For-
est Practices Act rules found that:
[C]urrent rules for riparian protection, large wood manage-
ment, sedimentation, and fish passage are not adequate to re-
serve depressed stocks of wild salmonids. . . . While these are
important as an initial step in accomplishing the mission of the
Oregon Plan, they are not sufficient for the recovery of critical
habitat for wild salmonids.144
Furthermore, timber industry-written provisions recently in-
serted into the Oregon Forest Practices Act actively inhibit addi-
tional efforts to protect damaged riparian areas in Oregon’s
timberlands.145  And unlike in California, logging operations are
still categorically exempt from all of Oregon’s water-quality and
pollution-control laws,146 even though their adverse impact on
water quality is well documented.
Likewise, Oregon exerts relatively weak regulatory control
over agriculturally generated sediment and chemical pollution,
even though many Oregon streams are listed as water-quality
limited under section 303(d) of the CWA primarily because of
142 See supra  note 60 and accompanying text. R
143 See, e.g. , NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., COASTAL COHO HABITAT FAC-
TORS FOR DECLINE AND PROTECTIVE EFFORTS IN OREGON 34-39 (1997); Memoran-
dum from Rowan Baker, Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., to Dan Avery (Jan. 2, 1997)
(on file with author) (critiquing the Oregon Forest Practice Rules); Letter from Dan
Opalski, Dir., Or. Operations Office, Envtl. Prot. Agency et al., to Dick Pedersen,
Manager, Dep’t of Envtl. Quality & Ted Lorensen, Forest Practices Program Dir.,
Dep’t of Forestry 2 (Feb. 28, 2001) (on file with author) (noting that, in spite of the
Oregon Forest Practice Rules, there have been water quality impairments due to
forest management activities).  Oregon’s forestry rules have since been weakened
further. See supra  note 100 and accompanying text. R
144 INDEP. MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCI. TEAM, supra  note 60, at 2. R
145 See OR. REV. STAT. § 527.714(5) (2005).  That provision delineates stringent
administrative requirements and findings of fact for adopting any new forestry pro-
tective measures, providing numerous opportunities for timber industry litigation to
challenge any new protections.
146 OR. REV. STAT. § 527.770.
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agricultural impacts.147  In spite of widespread water-quality im-
pacts, agricultural practices in Oregon, like logging, are also
largely exempt, and state law requires a high burden of proof to
be met for any enforcement action.148
Oregon’s agricultural water-quality improvement plans (often
referred to as SB 1010 Plans) are also mostly based on voluntary,
not mandatory, actions and are generally very weak.149  Addi-
tionally, Oregon’s lax water laws have allowed many of its rivers
to become over-appropriated for large parts of each year, prima-
rily because of water diversions for agricultural use.150  A perfect
example of this type of institutionalized water over-appropria-
tion is in the Klamath Basin.
Finally, state-based species recovery plans can address salmon
habitat problems only on non-federal lands.151  Yet a large per-
centage of still-viable salmonid habitat exists only on federal
lands, particularly in the sparsely settled Klamath Basin, with
some sub-basins (such as the Salmon River sub-basin) more than
90% federally owned.  Furthermore, these federal lands are gen-
erally in upper watersheds that are heavily forested, less urban-
ized, and in less-disturbed condition than privately owned lands
containing similar salmonid habitat.152  Federal ESA protections
on these federal lands are critical to maintaining their biological
integrity and to the eventual recovery of listed salmonid
stocks.153
147 See  Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, Water Quality Assessment Database, http://
www.deq.state.or.us/wq/assessment/rpt0406/search.asp (last visited May 4, 2007).
148 See OR. REV. STAT. § 568.912(3); see also OR. ADMIN. R. 340-041-0028(12)(f)
(2007) (exempting agriculture on state and private lands).  Agricultural water-qual-
ity-management plans are enforced not by the Oregon Department of Environmen-
tal Quality, but by the Oregon Department of Agriculture. OR. ADMIN. R. 340-041-
0028(12)(f).  The latter agency is far more inclined toward ignoring agricultural
violations.
149 See S.B. 1010, 67th Or. Legis. Ass’y (1993) (codified at OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 568.900-.933).  The bill was originally written by the Oregon Farm Bureau as part
of its political effort to head off more stringent CWA and state water-pollution regu-
lations of agriculture.
150 See ROBISON, supra  note 17, at 13 tbl.2.  Agriculture is by far the single largest R
water user in the state.  Michael R. Moore et al., Water Allocation in the American
West: Endangered Fish Versus Irrigated Agriculture , 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 319, 350
tbl.1 (1996).
151 See supra  note 50. R
152 See THE WILDERNESS SOC’Y, supra  note 50, at 55-62. R
153 See id.  at xv-xvii.  Recent efforts by the Bush administration to eliminate im-
portant federal salmon-protection rules under the Northwest Forest Plan’s Aquatic
Conservation Strategy and other federal laws demonstrate the need to maintain con-
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Agribusiness, forestry, real estate developers, and other re-
gional business-industry groups that profit from developing
salmonid habitat are also pushing for state control over salmon-
recovery efforts, often as a way to avoid federal ESA constraints
on their land practices and water diversions.154  One main reason
is that state legislatures are often far more vulnerable to industry
lobbying than the federal government, and efforts by regulated
industries to roll back major state environmental laws and curtail
enforcement of watershed protections have often been success-
ful.155  It is not surprising that these industries have also joined
efforts to roll back salmonid ESA listings through the courts.156
4. HCP Adaptive Management v. “No Surprises”
Since Bruce Babbitt’s 1992 policy pushing Habitat Conserva-
tion Plans (HCPs) by offering landowners with approved HCPs
tinued ESA-listing protections for depressed salmonid runs even when their habitat
lies solely on federal lands. See  Clarification of Provisions Relating to the Aquatic
Conservation Strategy in the 1994 Record of Decision for the Northwest Forest
Plan, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,486 (Apr. 26, 2004).  The administration’s efforts to accelerate
commercial logging by simply eliminating salmon-habitat protections under the
Northwest Forest Plan was challenged in Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s
Ass’ns. v. National Marine Fisheries Service .  These attempts were recently invali-
dated.  Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No.
04-1299-RSM, 2007 WL 1031717 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 30, 2007).
154 With the possible exception of California, few states have statutory protections
for endangered species as protective as the federal ESA.  William Snape III et al.,
Protecting Ecosystems Under the Endangered Species Act: The Sonoran Desert Ex-
ample , 41 WASHBURN L.J. 14, 40 (2001); see also  Christopher A. Amato & Robert
Rosenthal, Endangered Species Protection in New York After  State v. Sour Moun-
tain Realty, Inc., 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 117, 130-38 (2001) (discussing weaknesses in
several states’ endangered species laws).
155 For example, in Oregon, the timber industry has successfully lobbied to
weaken state forestry protections, including categorical exclusions for logging im-
pacts from Oregon’s water quality laws. See supra  note 145 and accompanying text. R
In Washington State, agribusiness and developers recently supported Senate Bill
5248, which imposes a four-and-a-half year moratorium on future riparian protec-
tions and designations of critical areas along streams—often necessary tools for
salmon restoration in many damaged watersheds, but ones threatening to agriculture
and developers. See  S.B. 5248, 60th Leg., 2007 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007).  Governor
Christine Gregoire signed the bill on May 8, 2007.
156 The ongoing Alsea II  litigation provides one such example.  Industry plaintiffs
include: the Building Industry Association of Washington, the Coalition for Idaho
Water, Idaho Water Users Association, Idaho Farm Bureau Federation, Washington
Farm Bureau, Washington Association of Realtors, Central Coast Forest Associa-
tion, California State Grange, Oregon State Grange, Pioneer Irrigation District.
Complaint at 3-25, Alsea Valley Alliance v. Lautenbacher, No. 06-6093-HO (D. Or.
May 1, 2006).  These groups seek the delisting of sixteen distinct salmonid popula-
tions. See supra  note 137. R
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“no surprises” and similar safe-harbor blanket protections from
future ESA enforcement, the number of HCPs has mushroomed.
There are now at least 499 approved HCPs nationwide, most of
them in the western United States, exempting more than 39 mil-
lion acres with many more in planning and development.157
HCP standards have improved, but many reflect only what the
landowner was willing to provide, not necessarily what the listed
species needed, and scientists have found that many HCPs are
seriously deficient just on the science and biology alone.158  Un-
fortunately, there is also no statutory requirement that HCPs,
which are little more than incidental-take permits under section
10, actually contribute toward species recovery, only that they
avoid jeopardy.159  Not surprisingly, this area is the subject of
litigation.160
5. Economics-Based v. Science-Based ESA Decision-Making
There are very few places in law in which science trumps eco-
nomics, even within the ESA, but the section 4 listing process is
one of those few.  Economic considerations do come into play in
ESA critical-habitat designations, in the recovery planning pro-
cess, and nearly everywhere else in the Act.  But the listing deci-
sion itself must be made “solely on the basis of the best scientific
and commercial data available.”161
157 See  U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Habitat Conservation Plans and Agreements
Database, http://ecos.fws.gov/conserv_plans/public.jsp (follow “Nationwide” hyper-
link under Habitat Conservation Plan; select “Regional (Summary) Report button)
(last visited May 4, 2007); see also  Marcilynn A. Burke, Klamath Farmers and Cap-
puccino Cowboys: The Rhetoric of the Endangered Species Act and Why It (Still)
Matters , 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 441, 451 n.54 (2004).
158 See, e.g. , NAT’L CTR. FOR ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS & SYNTHESIS & AM. INST.
OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, USING SCIENCE IN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS 2
(1999), available at  http://www.aibs.org/bookstore/resources/hcp-1999-01-14.pdf
(noting that HCPs are often inadequate under scientific standards more rigorous
than those found in the HCPs); Lisa Stiffler, Toad’s Fate in Landowner’s Hands ,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 3, 2005, at A11 (explaining that under inade-
quate, but approved HCPs, the endangered Houston toad’s survival is dependent on
voluntary landowner actions).
159 See  16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2006).
160 See  Spirit of the Sage Council v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2003)
(invalidating some of the current USFWS HCP procedural requirements), vacated ,
411 F.3d 225 (2005).  In response, the USFWS withdrew parts of its “no surprises”
HCP policy for reconsideration.  Withdrawal of Regulations Governing Incidental
Take Permit Revocation, 69 Fed. Reg. 29,669, 26,669 (May 25, 2004).
161 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).  The primary arguments involving economics and
the ESA are now about the extent and costs of designating critical habitat.  The Act
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Anti-ESA activists often speciously claim that the ESA is eco-
nomically devastating, but in fact there is absolutely no evidence
that the ESA seriously impacts state or regional economies, and
every reason to think that it does not.  For instance, a compre-
hensive study by the MIT Project on Environmental Politics and
Policy looked at the statistical relationship between the number
of species listed in each state as compared to that state’s eco-
nomic performance over the period of 1975-90.  That study con-
cluded that the Endangered Species Act has had no measurable
economic impact on state economic performance.  Controlling
for differences in state area and extractive industry dependence,
the study instead found that states with the highest numbers of
listed species also enjoyed the highest economic growth rates and
the largest increases in economic growth rates:
The one and a half decades of state data examined in this
paper strongly contradict the assertion that the Endangered
Species Act has had harmful effects on state economies.  Pro-
tections offered to threatened animals and plants do not im-
pose a measurable economic burden on development activity
at the state level.  In fact the evidence points to the converse.
. . . .
. . . In fact, for every tale about a project, business, or prop-
erty owner allegedly harmed by the efforts to protect some
plant or animal species there are over one thousand stories of
virtual “non-interference.”  In reviewing the record of 18,211
endangered species consultations by the Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice/National Marine Fisheries covering the period 1987-1991
the General Accounting Office found that only 11% (2050)
resulted in the issuance of formal biological opinions.  The
other 89% were handled informally—that is to say the
projects proceeded on schedule and without interference.  Of
the 2050 formal opinions issued a mere 181—less than 10%—
concluded that the proposed projects were likely to pose a
threat to an endangered plant or animal.  And most of these
requires the designation of critical habitat “on the basis of the best scientific data
available and after taking into consideration the economic impact  . . . and any other
relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat.” Id.
§ 1533(b)(2) (emphasis added).  Recent cases brought by land-development and
homebuilder groups have resulted in courts tossing out existing critical-habitat des-
ignations for many salmonid listings on economic-analysis grounds, and sweetheart
settlement agreements by the Bush administration have now sharply curtailed
redesignated critical habitat areas. See, e.g. , Designation of Critical Habitat for
Seven ESUs of Pacific Salmon and Steelhead in California, 70 Fed. Reg. 52,488
(Sept. 2, 2005) (substantially contracting previous critical habitat designation); Des-
ignation of Critical Habitat for Twelve ESUs of West Coast Salmon in Washington,
Oregon, and Idaho, 70 Fed. Reg. 52,630 (Sept. 2, 2005) (same).
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181 projects were completed, albeit with some modification in
design or construction.  In short, more than 99% of the
projects reviewed under the Endangered Species Act eventu-
ally proceeded unhindered or with marginal additional time
and economic costs.  Given the political and economic screen-
ing that occurs in listings cases it is not surprising that no mea-
surable negative economic effects are detectable.162
D. A Tale of Two Water Crises
The main impact of the ESA in the Klamath Basin has been to
curtail excessive water diversions by the Klamath Irrigation Pro-
ject and to force the region to finally grapple with problems of
massive water over-appropriation.  However, Upper Klamath
Basin agricultural interests still cite “devastating” economic
losses from the Project water curtailments of 2001 as a reason
why the ESA should be repealed or its impacts on the Project
(and by analogy other federal water projects) substantially
curtailed.
The facts do not support these arguments.  For instance, during
the massive drought of 2001, Project water would have been sig-
nificantly curtailed anyway and crop losses would still have oc-
curred.  There was simply not enough water to meet all irrigation
demands because of the drought.  What apparently rankled Pro-
ject irrigators the most, however, is that during 2001, water allo-
cations were provided as a first priority for instream minimum
flows to the river and minimum levels in Upper Klamath Lake to
protect ESA-listed fish from extinction, something that had
never happened before.163
Ultimately, during 2001, upper Basin irrigators dependent on
the federal irrigation Project got about 67% of a normal water
year’s water allocation from a combination of late July flows
from Upper Klamath Lake (due to a fortuitous July rainfall) and
at least 100,000 acre-feet of emergency groundwater augmenta-
tion.  Parts of the Project that received water from Clear Lake or
Gerber Reservoir rather than Upper Klamath Lake received full
allotments.  Other irrigators received emergency payments for
the use of their water by the Bureau.  While some serious crop
losses did occur, total crop losses were later found to be far less
162 Stephen M. Moyer, Endangered Species Listings and State Economic Perform-
ance  15-16 (Mass. Inst. of Tech., Project on Envtl. Politics and Policy, Working Paper
No. 4, 1995).
163 See supra  notes 83-84, 116-17 and accompanying text. R
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than the hyper-inflated figures touted by “Bucket Brigade” activ-
ists and anti-ESA forces.164
It should also be kept in mind that non-Project farmers receiv-
ing no water from the Project irrigation system suffered no water
losses and no crop losses other than those typical of any other
dry year.  Most non-Project farmers either already practice dry-
land farming and ranching, or have access to groundwater pump-
ing at all times.  Only a relatively few Upper Basin irrigators de-
pendent on the Project—and then only a few hundred out of
about 1200—had serious crop loss problems during 2001.165
Additionally, there were economic gains from the reallocation
of water to the Klamath River during 2001 that are never ac-
knowledged.  Tens of millions of dollars in West Coast ocean
salmon fisheries losses, and possibly another major fish kill, may
well have been averted.  Large numbers of juvenile fall Chinook
salmon that out-migrated during early 2001 with higher flows
contributed to a relative healthy ocean escapement as harvest-
able adults in late 2004, helping to make 2004 a relatively good
salmon harvest season.166  Had the limited water available in
2001 been allocated instead to upper Basin irrigation, as it had
always been in past droughts, then water levels in the river would
likely have been even lower during 2001 than those that triggered
two massive fish kills in 2002, resulting in huge economic losses
for salmon-dependent fishing communities over 700 miles of Cal-
ifornia and Oregon coastline.
The second recent water crisis to hit the Basin was caused in
2002 by Bureau actions, largely politically driven and to appease
164 Klamath Basin Coalition, The Truth About Klamath Project Irrigation Water
Deliveries in 2001, http://www.klamathbasin.info/2001waterfacts.pdf (last visited
Apr. 14, 2007); see supra  note 34 and accompanying text. R
165 The impact of the 2001 Project water curtailments hit some hard, but the im-
pact was by no means uniform.  Many hundreds of farmers within the Klamath Pro-
ject (i.e., those dependent on water from Gerber Reservoir or Clear Lake) got full
water deliveries during 2001 from those sources.  Others took water directly through
one or another of the approximately seventy small diversion intakes from Keno Res-
ervoir and were also not affected.  Still others (mostly in and around Tule Lake) had
access to emergency groundwater pumps paid for and installed by the State of Cali-
fornia, and suffered little water loss.  Only those irrigators completely dependent on
water from Upper Klamath Lake through the A-Canal and with no access to
groundwater suffered major water shortages during 2001.
166 Since fall Chinook salmon typically have a four-year lifecycle, those eggs laid
in fall 2000 would have hatched and out-migrated as juveniles in spring 2001 during
a period of ESA-protected flows, returning as adults primarily during 2004 where
they contributed to harvests.
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Upper Basin irrigators, that left too little water for fish in the
Klamath River.  After the 2001 drought, the Bureau was under
heavy political pressure in 2002 to resume full deliveries of water
to the Project.  The Bureau proposed 2002 operations that would
deliver a more or less normal year’s water allotment to its con-
tract irrigators and water districts.  NOAA Fisheries was also
under similar pressure from Bush administration appointees to
accept the Bureau’s proposal in its BiOp, which it did that year in
spite of continuing drought as well as warnings by NOAA Fisher-
ies scientists and others that stripping the river of that much
water would expose the lower river fish to high risk of a major
fish kill.167
As a direct result of excessive Bureau irrigation-water diver-
sions, there were indeed two large fish kills in the lower Klamath
River during 2002—a large juvenile kill in spring of 2002, and the
more infamous adult fish kill in September in which more than
68,000 otherwise-healthy adult spawners died in the lower river
before they could swim upstream and spawn.168  The economic
impacts of the back-to-back salmon kills in the Klamath River in
2002, which represented a huge loss of salmon productivity, were
anticipated to be economically devastating—and were, as dis-
cussed below.169
167 See  Deposition of NOAA Fisheries Biologist Michael S. Kelly at 32-84, Pac.
Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, No. 02-2006-
SBA, 2006 WL 798920 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2006).  In its 2002 Biological Assessment
the Bureau proposed 2002 in-river water levels below Iron Gate Dam that were at
near-record low flows.  NOAA Fisheries’ Technical Review Team objected to these
levels as posing unacceptable risks to ESA-listed coho salmon.  Under pressure from
the Bush administration, however, political appointees within NOAA Fisheries later
overruled the agency’s own scientists and approved a NOAA Fisheries 2002-12
Coho BiOp based on the Bureau’s dangerously low flow proposals. See  Posting of
Mike Kelly to The Undercover Activist Blog, http://peer.org/wordpress/?p=112
(Apr. 26, 2007).  The head of the Agency’s Coho Technical Review Team, Michael
Kelly, later sought whistleblower protection against retaliation by NOAA Fisheries
for his statements critical of its 2002 decision to override the team’s recommenda-
tion. See  Press Release, Pub. Employees for Envtl. Responsibility, Whistleblower
Testifies Against Agency in Klamath Fish Kill (Mar. 19, 2003), http://www.peer.org/
news/news_id.php?row_id=231.  Kelly’s claim was denied, however, and he is no
longer with NOAA Fisheries.
168 See CAL. DEP’T OF FISH & GAME, FINAL ANALYSIS OF CONTRIBUTING FAC-
TORS, at III (2004), available at  http://www.pcffa.org/KlamFishKillFactorsDFGRe-
port.pdf.  The 34,000 figure sometimes still cited represents a conservative initial
estimate, based on a flawed counting methodology.  In the final report, the esti-
mated losses were twice as high (i.e., about 68,000). Id.
169 See infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\22-1\OEL102.txt unknown Seq: 44 14-AUG-07 15:35
92 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 22, 49
In the end, the main impact of the ESA on the Klamath Basin
has probably been to force the agencies most responsible for
water over-allocation in the Basin to, however reluctantly, reallo-
cate that water in light of a need to protect all  interests, including
both lower- and upper-Basin fish and wildlife needs, and not just
irrigation.  What the combined double-whammy water and fish
crises of 2001 and 2002 told us more than anything is that the past
status quo in the Basin is no longer biologically or economically
sustainable, that water over-allocation is a reality that has to be
dealt with, and that past irrigation-biased water-allocation prac-
tices simply needed to change.
II
GRAPPLING WITH ROTATING WATER CRISES: WATER OVER-
ALLOCATION AND FISH-KILLING DAMS
Much of the Upper Klamath Basin is naturally arid, all of it is
drought-prone, and water availability is always an issue.  What
the back-to-back water crises of 2001 and 2002 also made clear is
that the Basin’s limited surface-water supply is, in many loca-
tions, over-appropriated for human uses at the expense of fish
survival, based on archaic water laws that fail to take instream
fish needs into account.
One source of the conflict is that most of the water rights in the
Upper Basin in Oregon have never been legally adjudicated, so
there is no enforcement by Oregon state agencies against illegal
use (or even a recognition that any use can be  illegal unless rights
are adjudicated), and little monitoring or measuring of total con-
sumption.  A painfully tedious adjudication process has been
ongoing for more than twenty-five years, with several more years
to run.170
A huge problem in the adjudication process is meeting tribal
water rights held by the Klamath Tribes of Oregon.  Federal
courts have ruled that the Tribes’ treaty-based water rights are
senior to all others in the Basin.171  In spite of favorable federal
rulings, however, the Oregon Water Resources Department
(OWRD) has taken the legal position that these most senior (but
unadjudicated) tribal water rights are still inchoate, and thus has
170 See supra  note 85.  For more information on the Oregon Klamath Basin water R
right adjudication process, see Water Resources Department, Klamath Basin Adju-
dication, http://www.oregon.gov/OWRD/ADJ/index.shtml (last visited May 5, 2007).
171 See  United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1413-14 (9th Cir. 1983).
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not set aside any water to satisfy them.172  Nevertheless, the
OWRD still issues water permits within the Upper Klamath Ba-
sin, based on a water-availability analysis that ignores potentially
huge tribal-water obligations it will almost certainly be forced to
satisfy in the near future.
Furthermore, while the OWRD “considers” the impacts of the
ESA in the Basin, it still does not set aside any water or curtail
any existing water rights for meeting legally senior ESA water
obligations, even though these conflicting ESA water needs tech-
nically supersede state water-rights.173  Ignoring these two obvi-
ous future water needs, the OWRD instead continues to give out
Klamath Basin water rights that cannot be fulfilled, thus exacer-
bating future water over-allocation problems throughout the
Basin.174
Something similar occurs in California, again based on obso-
lete water-allocation policies that do not take ecological needs
into account.  Unlike in Oregon, groundwater permitting is de-
centralized in California and under the jurisdiction of each
county.175  Also, there is no requirement for any cumulative-im-
pacts analysis across county lines when (as is typical) an aquifer
172 Personal knowledge of the author, based on communications with Bob
Hunter, Staff Attorney for WaterWatch of Oregon, Medford Field Office.
173 See generally  Letter from Bob Hunter, Staff Attorney, WaterWatch of Oregon,
to Phil Ward, Dir., Water Res. Comm’n (Oct. 18, 2005) (on file with author) (ad-
dressing several major concerns with existing OWRD allocation policy).  In consid-
ering new water permit applications OAR 690-033-220 and OAR 690-033-0330
require only consideration of ESA-listed species’ essential habitat as defined by
OAR 635-415-0005(4), but do not themselves require set-asides of any instream
water to meet these species’ needs.
174 The Oregon Water Resources Commission has the authority under ORS
536.410 to withdraw the Upper Klamath Basin from further appropriation, but ref-
uses to do so in spite of considerable evidence that the Basin is already over-appro-
priated.  WaterWatch of Oregon, the PCFFA, and other organizations have twice
formally petitioned the Commission to close the Upper Basin to further water ap-
propriation until the adjudication process is final and groundwater studies intended
to determine whether the Upper Basin aquifers are being overdrawn have been
completed. See  Petition for Withdrawal Klamath Basin Waters from Further Adju-
dication, WaterWatch of Oregon v. Or. Water Res. Comm’n (Or. Water Res.
Comm’n filed July 1, 2005); Petition for Withdrawal or Emergency Rulemaking, In
re  Withdrawal or Immediate Closure of the Basin Waters (Or. Water Res. Comm’n
filed May 28, 2001).
175 In California, planning of city and county water supplies are to be addressed
by local city and county general plans. CAL. WATER CODE § 10910 (West 2007).
Well permits and permitting standards are also the responsibility of cities and coun-
ties. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13801(c), 13803.
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spans two or more counties.176  As a result, important Klamath
tributaries such as the Scott and Shasta rivers are increasingly
dewatered every year by diverting groundwater inflows that once
fed them.  Large parts of these important Klamath River tributa-
ries now go dry most years.177  Some local restoration efforts are
aimed at trying to recapture or purchase this lost instream water
to return it to the river, even while state and county agencies
work at cross-purposes to give more away.178
In both upper and lower sub-basins, instream shortfalls are be-
ing supplemented through widespread aquifer drawdowns by
groundwater pumping.179  However, there is growing evidence
that drawdowns now exceed the ability of these aquifers to
recharge–-where such studies have been done at all.  Aquifers
augment stream flows through springs, so drawing down aquifers
to meet stream shortfalls can exacerbate the effects in the end-
less, expensive, no-win, vicious cycle of pumping the same water
around in circles.180
176 For example, Siskiyou County, Cal., and Klamath County, Or., are thought to
be hydrologically connected through groundwater flows, and Siskiyou County’s aq-
uifer system may overlap with other California counties.  However, Siskiyou County
has never done a sustainable draw study of its aquifer system, but nevertheless con-
tinues to issue well permits in spite of mounting evidence of groundwater over-
appropriation.
177 See  Letter from Vivian Helliwell, Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns &
Inst. for Fisheries Res., to Song Her, Clerk, Cal. Water Res. Bd. (Oct. 29, 2006),
http://www.pcffa.org/ShastaTMDLStateBd10-29-06.pdf.  ESA-listed coho salmon
are particularly dependent on small tributary habitats like the Scott and Shasta for
over-wintering.
178 The California Department of Fish and Game has in recent years purchased
water from local ranchers and farmers along the Scott River to augment dangerously
low summer flows in that coho-bearing river system, while at the same time Siskiyou
County continues to issue nearby groundwater well permits that deplete the very
aquifers that feed Scott River instream flows. See  Letter from Glen Spain, Pac.
Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns & Inst. of Fisheries Res. et al., to Tam Doduc,
Chair, State Water Res. Control Bd. 10-14, 12 tbl.1 (June 12, 2006) (on file with
author).
179 A significant example is the “water bank” program of the Bureau, under which
Upper Klamath Basin groundwater is purchased in large volume to augment Kla-
math River instream flows to replace water diverted by the Project, at a cost of
several million dollars annually.  For more details, see 2006 Water Bank, http://
www.usbr.gov/mp/kbao/pilot_water_bank/2006_water_bank.html (last visited Apr.
15, 2007).
180 Recent studies conducted by the U.S. Geological Survey, for instance, have
concluded that at least 60% of the inflow to Upper Klamath Lake, which directly
feeds the Klamath River, derives directly from groundwater rather than surface
water stream-flow. MARSHALL W. GANNETT ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, GROUNDWATER HYDROLOGY OF THE UPPER KLA-
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Lower Klamath Basin tribes (the Yurok, Karuk, and Hoopa)
also have protected interests in the waters of the Klamath River
sufficient to protect their tribal rights to abundant fisheries.181
For many years, a series of major fishery closures have been
mandated by federal law on the basis of weak-stock management
of Klamath salmon.  The biological principle of weak-stock man-
agement is now embodied in the Pacific Coast Salmon Plan
adopted by the Pacific Fishery Management Council (PFMC)
and the Secretary of Commerce, pursuant to the Magnuson-Ste-
vens Sustainable Fisheries Act.182  Under Amendment 14 of that
plan, wherever weak Klamath stocks intermingle in the ocean
with healthy stocks, fishing opportunities on all of them must be
constrained on the basis of the potential impacts on these weak-
est Klamath stocks.  The weakest Klamath stock thus becomes
the “weakest link” limiting factor on all other  ocean salmon har-
vests, not only within the Klamath Management Zone (KMZ),
but also far north (nearly to the Columbia River) and far south
(to at least Monterey, California) of KMZ waters in ocean areas
where Klamath stocks might migrate to any significant degree.183
In the Klamath, the “minimum spawner floor” (i.e., the num-
ber of fish that must be able to return to their spawning grounds
to maximize stream productivity for the next generation), is cur-
rently 35,000 for Klamath fall Chinook.184  If the Klamath fall
Chinook stocks become too weak to meet that minimum spawner
floor, then weak-stock management principles require that all
ocean fishing that potentially impacts that weak stock within
MATH BASIN, OREGON AND CALIFORNIA 37 (2007), available at  http://pubs.usgs.gov/
sir/2007/5050.  However, in recent years that same groundwater aquifer has also
been heavily tapped by the Bureau to supplement lowered flows in the Klamath
River, indirectly reducing inflows to Upper Klamath Lake, and thus ultimately re-
ducing net inflows to the Klamath River that same program is trying to replace.
181 See  Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539, 545-46 (9th Cir. 1995).
182 PAC. FISHERIES MGMT. COUNCIL, PACIFIC COAST SALMON PLAN 1 (2003),
available at http: //www.pcouncil .org / salmon/salfmp/ fmpthrua14 .pdf. The
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act provides for federal
management of fisheries in federal waters between 3 and 200 miles from the shore.
Id.  The PFMC is one of several regional fishery advisory councils established under
the Act to advise the Secretary of Commerce on the management of federal
fisheries.
183 See id.  at 3-3 to -7.  Amendment 15, intended to provide some additional flexi-
bility to the minimum spawner floor of 35,000, is currently under consideration by
the Secretary of Commerce as of the date of this writing. See Amendment 15, 72
Fed. Reg. 27,276 (May 15, 2007).
184 See id.  at 3-3.
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mixed-stock ocean fisheries must end.185  There is currently no
directed commercial fishery on Klamath coho salmon.186
The Klamath fall Chinook has frequently been the weakest of
these West Coast stocks.  As more Klamath River salmonid
habitat has been lost or biologically compromised over the de-
cades—through combinations of river and tributary dewatering,
impacts of the Klamath Hydroelectric Project dams, and other
factors—more Klamath stocks have declined.187  Thus, once-
abundant fisheries within the ocean region where most Klamath-
origin fish migrate—the KMZ—have suffered major closures in
what would otherwise have been relatively abundant salmon fish-
eries, at great economic and social cost to fishing-dependent
communities.188  Economic secondary-effects of Klamath fisher-
ies declines cause additional job losses and economic suffering up
and down the coastline which,189 had Basin salmon been prop-
erly protected in the first place, would be unnecessary.
185 This was the basis of major ocean salmon fishery closures during 2005, 2006,
and somewhat similar but slightly less restrictive closures in 2007.  In Monterey, Cal.,
for example, one Klamath-origin fall Chinook might be caught for every sixty to
seventy fall Chinook from other areas, which means that Klamath-driven weak stock
management closures there would cost fishermen between sixty to seventy harvest-
able fish for every single Klamath fish avoided.
186 Because of their weak-stock status, there has been no directed fishery on Kla-
math coho for many years, since well before any ESA listings.  Because these fish
are now ESA-listed, every effort is made to avoid even incidental take of Klamath
coho.  Since Chinook and coho have very different life-cycle and migration patterns,
it is possible to avoid nearly all Klamath coho impacts in ocean commercial fisheries.
187 Ocean escapements to the Klamath (i.e., the number of salmon from the Kla-
math returning as mature adults) for 2006 were only about 30,000 despite wide-
spread ocean-salmon fishery closures imposed as emergency conservation measures
during that season.  Peter Sleeth, Forecast Points to Better Season for Fishermen ,
OREGONIAN (Portland), Feb. 16, 2007, at D1.  The minimum spawner floor of 35,000
is only 4% of estimated pre-development ocean escapements of 880,000. See supra
note 3 and accompanying text. R
188 The KMZ is the ocean area from Horse Mountain (near Fort Bragg, Cal.) to
Humbug Mountain (near Florence, Or.), extending 200 miles offshore and including
all U.S. territorial waters in between.  This region is specially managed by the
PFMC.  The fishing ports within the Zone include Fort Bragg, Cal., Eureka, Cal.,
Crescent City, Cal., and Brookings, Or.  These ports were once the nation’s most
productive salmon fishing ports outside of Alaska.  However, annual average salmon
landings over 2001–04 to ports within the KMZ have plummeted by between 82%
for Brookings to 97% losses for Eureka, as compared to annual average salmon
landings during 1976–80. PAC. FISHERIES MGMT. COUNCIL, REVIEW OF 2005
OCEAN SALMON FISHERIES 88 tbl.IV-6, 89 tbl.IV-7 (2006), available at  http://
pcouncil.org/salmon/salsafe05/salsafe05.pdf.
189 See  Peter Sleeth, Lawmakers Fight Plan to Halt Salmon Fishing , OREGONIAN
(Portland), Mar. 11, 2006, at B1.
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In the Klamath in 2005 and 2006, adult spawner returns were
far below past ten-year averages, and in 2006 also were well be-
low the 35,000 minimum spawner floor, in spite of relatively good
ocean conditions and larger than normal runs in nearly every
other neighboring river system.  This deep dip in only the Kla-
math largely reflects spawning productivity losses from the mas-
sive Klamath River adult fish kill of September 2002, in which as
many as 68,000 adult salmon (mostly fall Chinook but also hun-
dreds of ESA-listed coho) died before they could spawn because
of low-water conditions.
Flows to the lower river at Iron Gate Dam are entirely con-
trolled by the Bureau, which first subtracts water for its Klamath
Irrigation Project upstream of the dams.  During the 2002
drought year, irrigators at the Project were provided normal-
year, full-water deliveries in spite of continuing drought.  The de-
cision was apparently driven primarily by election-year politics,
not science.190
In fact, NOAA Fisheries’ own Technical Review Team scien-
tists urged the agency to not sign off on the BiOp proposed by
the Bureau, claiming that the extremely low flows provided to
the lower river in the Bureau’s plan exposed fish in the lower
river to unjustifiable risks of a major fish-kill.  NOAA Fisheries
signed off anyway.191  The result of this betrayal of science was
that the Klamath suffered the worst adult-salmon fish-kill in U.S.
history.192
The loss of this much productivity in one year was inevitably
devastating to later ocean-salmon fisheries.  As the PFMC noted,
“The fish kill will likely make it impossible to meet the escape-
ment goal this year, and the loss of the reproductive potential of
these fish will result in diminished returns three, four and five
years into the future.”193  This is precisely what has happened.194
190 See  Tom Hamburger, Oregon Water Saga Illuminates Rove’s Methods With
Agencies , WALL ST. J., July 30, 2003, at A4.
191 See supra  note 159 and accompanying text.
192 See supra  note 168 and accompanying text. R
193 See  Letter from Hans Radtke, Chairman, Pac. Fishery Mgmt. Council, to Gale
Norton, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, & Donald Evans, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce 2 (Dec. 4, 2002), http://www.pcffa.org/PFMCKlamathletter12-02.pdf.
Other factors, including serious water-quality problems and the spread of fish patho-
gens triggered by the Klamath Hydroelectric Project dams since 2002, have also
likely contributed to poor rebounds from these devastating losses, exacerbating the
escapement declines of 2005 and 2006, and predicted for 2007. See CAL. FISH &
GAME, supra  note 168, at III. R
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During 2006, the northern California and Oregon ocean-
salmon fisheries suffered a greater than 90% closure from a nor-
mal season.  The total economic costs to the fishing industry of
these 2006 Klamath-driven closures is expected to top $100 mil-
lion in 2006 alone.195  The Secretary of Commerce as well as the
Governors of Oregon and California declared economic emer-
gencies in spring 2006 to seek disaster assistance for closed ports
and out-of-work commercial fishermen.196  Two bills to compen-
sate coastal communities for these economic losses have been
filed in the 110th Congress.197
The back-to-back water and fisheries crises reflect the fact that
rotating water-and-fisheries crises and declining ecosystem integ-
rity are now the rule rather than the exception in the Klamath
194 Preliminary estimates of ocean escapement for Klamath fall Chinook for 2007
are currently 60,000.  Sleeth, supra  note 187.  This is more than enough to meet the R
35,000 spawner floor requirements but still far short of a normal season’s return
rates, just as was predicted by the PFMC. See supra  text accompanying note 193. R
The 2007 ocean commercial-salmon season will thus be a little less restrictive, but
otherwise resemble, that of 2005, during which the industry suffered about a 60%
closure as compared to a normal season.  The 2008 fishing season, with the effects of
the 2002 fish kill finally behind us, is predicted to be much more like an average to
above-average season.
195 Direct fishing-industry losses to Oregon and California were at first considera-
bly underestimated, but have since been estimated at $60.4 million cumulatively by
the two states, and this is the amount that has been requested from Congress.   Indi-
rect and induced secondary losses to allied businesses such as processors and ship-
pers, and to the economic chain of commerce, are not accounted for in these
numbers, nor are potential future losses from loss of wild salmon markets to farm
fish which may take years to recover.  The number $100 million in losses for closures
suffered in 2006 is thus a reasonable, even a conservative, estimate of total economic
losses. See  Glen Spain & Zeke Grader, Can’t Fish Salmon? Federal Klamath Water
Policies Are to Blame , FISHERMEN’S NEWS, Apr. 2005, available at  http://
www.pcffa.org/fn-apr05.htm.
196 See  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Declaration Concerning the Kla-
math River Fall Chinook Salmon Fishery (Aug. 10, 2006), available at  http://www.
commerce.gov/opa/press/Secretary_Gutierrez/2006_Releases/August/Klamath.pdf.
See also  Cal. Proclamation: California Salmon Runs (June 6, 2006), available at
http://www.governor.ca.gov/govsite/pdf/press_release_2006/StateofEmergency_CA_
Salmon_Runs_6-6-06.pdf; Or. Exec. Order No. EO-06-06 (Apr. 24, 2006), reprinted
in OR. BULL., June 1, 2006, at 4.  Governor Kulongoksi declared a state of emer-
gency in Clatsop County in a later executive order.  Or. Exec. Order No. EO-06-07
(Apr. 26, 2006), reprinted in OR. BULL., June 1, 2006, at 5.
197 See  Pacific Salmon Emergency Disaster Assistance Act of 2007, H.R. 234,
110th Cong. (2007); see also  Pacific Salmon Emergency Disaster Assistance Act of
2007, S. 145, 110th Cong. (2007) (a companion bill to House Bill 234). There are also
disaster relief funds tied to various supplemental appropriations bills, one of which
was vetoed in May 2007.  However, as of this writing, no federal Klamath fishery
disaster assistance had yet been appropriated by Congress.
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Basin, and also demonstrate how these crises adversely affect
nearly every community and stakeholder in the upper and lower
sub-basins.  The practices of the past that encourage these types
of rotating crises clearly are not sustainable.  Driven by these cri-
ses, several hopeful efforts to correct these problems, though late
to start, are gaining momentum.
A. An On-Going Water Adjudication Process á la
Bleak House
One of the legal contexts, as noted by the court in Klamath
Irrigation District , was the long-standing Oregon water-rights ad-
judication process still ongoing in the Upper Klamath Basin.  A
large number of pre-1909 water-rights claims in the upper Basin
have never been adjudicated; there are thousands of conflicting
claims, and contests for every claim, all under consideration by
the OWRD.198  All of this creates a regulatory and enforcement
nightmare for the OWRD.  As a result of all these claims, the
OWRD takes the position that it cannot enforce water rights nor
curtail possible over-drafts in most of the unadjudicated upper
areas.199
The Basin water-right adjudication process began in 1975 and
preliminary decisions are not expected to be submitted to the
Klamath County Circuit Court until at least December 2009—a
deadline date that has slipped numerous times before and is
likely to do so again.200  Entire legal careers have been created as
a result of this adjudication process and, like in Charles Dickens’
Bleak House,201  about the legal case that would never end, many
of the original claimants (and some of the attorneys) have since
died or retired.
198 The OWRD lists 730 separate Upper Basin water-right claims under adjudica-
tion, with 5660 separate contests currently filed.  Or. Water Res. Dep’t, Current Sta-
tistics, http://www1.wrd.state.or.us/files/Publications/klamath-adj/Status_of_the_
Adjudication.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
199 Agency non-enforcement in the midst of the legal uncertainties is understand-
able but has been much criticized by water-conservation organizations such as
WaterWatch of Oregon, which has documented several instances of excessive water
use in the Upper Basin.  Personal knowledge of the author based on communication
with Lisa Brown, Attorney, WaterWatch of Oregon.
200 Personal knowledge of the author based on communication with Phillip C.
Ward, Director, Oregon Water Resources Department.
201 CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 1971)
(1853).
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However, there has been one significant interim ruling worthy
of note.  In January 2006, an administrative law judge issued an
Interim Order that the Project water users do not, in general,
have any legal water rights at all, but instead have rights only
insofar as they have contract water-delivery rights with the Bu-
reau.202  The Interim Order independently confirms Klamath Ir-
rigation District ’s holding that there is no compensable property
right vested in the Project irrigators for water in the system.203
B. Steps Toward Decommissioning the Klamath Dams
[T]he increasing loss of fish habitat, to pollution, unwise devel-
opment and other human activities, is the single largest long-term
threat to the future viability of the marine fisheries of the United
States. . . .  Protection of habitat is the cheapest investment the na-
tion can make to sustain productive fisheries.204
Some portions of the current Klamath Hydroelectric Project,
now owned by PacifiCorp, began in 1895, but hydroelectric de-
velopment began in earnest with the construction in 1918 of the
first Copco Dam, which was built without fish passage of any
sort.  Power dams and related structures were added over the de-
cades,205 and today there are four main dams: Iron Gate (the
lowest in the river system), Copco Nos. 1 and 2, and J.C. Boyles.
There are also a non-power flow-regulatory structure, Keno
Dam, and several small components—Fall Creek Dam, and the
East Side and West Side Powerhouses at Link River Dam—
bringing the total to eight structures.  Link River Dam is a very
small, irrigation-diversion dam hydrologically above the
PacifiCorp dams and is owned by the Bureau.206
The entire set of dams has a combined, licensed, maximum-
installed capacity for generation of a mere 161 megawatts,
202 Interim Order at 16, In re  Adjudication of Relative Rights of the Klamath
River, No. 003 (Or. Water Res. Dep’t Jan. 12, 2006).
203 See supra  notes 113-20 and accompanying text. R
204 Ken Hinman & Carl Safina, Summary and Recommendations , in STEMMING
THE TIDE OF COASTAL FISH HABITAT LOSS 245, 245-48 (Richard H. Stroud ed.,
1992).
205 1 PACIFICORP, KLAMATH FINAL LICENSE APPLICATION §§ C2.2-8.1, at 2-1 to
8-1 (2004) [hereinafter KLAMATH FINAL LICENSE APPLICATION], available at  http://
www.pacificorp.com/Article/Article28613.html.
206 Id.  § A2.1, at 2-1.  The Eastside and Westside power plants are attached to
Link River Dam but are very old and very small and PacifiCorp intends to decom-
mission them as part of any new license.  The other PacifiCorp structures are all
lower down in the river system.
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though in fact various operational limitations, seasonal-flow re-
strictions, and ramping-rate restrictions mean that it has histori-
cally generated only about half that, or about 82 megawatts for
an annual production average.207  To put the size of this project
into perspective, the combined power-generation capacity of this
entire complex is only a very small fraction of the power-genera-
tion capacity of a single modern, thermal-turbine power plant.208
The entire actual generation of the Klamath dams now amounts
to less than 2% of PacifiCorp’s total generation of 8460 mega-
watts.209  This number would be reduced by at least another esti-
mated 23% with the addition of proposed fish ladders and
reduced ramping-rates as specified in federal agency
prescriptions.210
The dams provide no irrigation-water diversions per se, since
all water diversions for the Project are located well above the
power dams, at the Link River Dam A-Canal intake in Upper
Klamath Lake.211  What few water-diversion points exist from
within the Klamath Hydroelectric Project area include only
about seventy small water diversions from the lake and reservoir
above Keno Dam, a non-power regulatory dam which PacifiCorp
207 The entire Klamath Hydroelectric Project generates an annual average of
716,820 megawatt-hours (MWh), which amounts to a continuous capacity of only
81.94 megawatts. KLAMATH HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT DEIS, supra  note 4, at R
xxvii.
208 PacifiCorp operates ten thermal-electric units that generate electricity from
coal, geothermal, or natural-gas resources. The company is also part owner of six
thermal plants. Together, these plants generate 9133 megawatts of electricity, which
account for more than 83% of PacifiCorp’s generation capabilities.  On average,
these thermal plants generate 571 megawatts of electricity each, compared to the
eighty-eight megawatts average-generation capacity of the Klamath Hydroelectric
Project dams.  PacifiCorp, Thermal Generation, http://www.pacificorp.com/Naviga-
tion/Navigation591.html (last visited May 5, 2007).
209 KLAMATH HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT DEIS, supra  note 4, § 1.2, at 1-3. R
210 M. CUBED, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, PUBL’N NO. CEC-700-2006-010, ECO-
NOMIC MODELING OF RELICENSING AND DECOMMISSIONING OPTIONS FOR THE
KLAMATH BASIN HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT 2 (2006), available at  http://www.en-
ergy.ca.gov/2006publications/CEC-700-2006-010/CEC-700-2006-010.PDF; see also
Letter from B.B. Blevins, Executive Dir., Cal. Energy Comm’n, to Magalie R. Salas,
Sec’y, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n 3 (Dec. 1, 2006), available at  http://
elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=11197393 (“Klamath Project
generation would be reduced 23 percent to an average annual level of 562,790
MWh.”).
211 The intake for the Klamath Irrigation Project is at the A-canal, adjacent to
Link River Dam, which is a small diversion dam owned by the Bureau. See supra
text accompanying note 206. R
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has specifically excluded from its Final License Application.212
In any event, Keno Dam is unlikely to be removed.  There has
been no request that Keno Dam be removed (only for it to have
fish passage) and none of these water diversions would be af-
fected by the decommissioning of the rest of the Project.213
Unlike much larger rivers such as the Snake, there is no river
transportation through the dams, and the flood-control capacity
of the entire system is very small—less than two days of flow at
maximum storage.214  Power production was the designed pur-
pose of the system, not flood control.
Like all privately owned power dams, the Klamath Hydroelec-
tric Project operates pursuant to a power license from the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).  The Klamath
Project’s FERC license includes all its dams and structures, in-
cluding the non-power Keno Dam, and was last reissued in 1956
for a term of fifty years.215
Despite promises of fish passage dating back to 1916, none of
these dams have fish passage for lower river salmonids.216  This
would no longer be permitted under current environmental stan-
212 1 KLAMATH FINAL LICENSE APPLICATION, supra  note 206, §§ A2.1-.2, at 2-1 to R
-2.
213 See KLAMATH HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT DEIS, supra  note 4, §§ 2.1.1.2, R
2.2.1.2, at 2-5, 2-17.  See also id.  §§ 5.2.19 and 5.4.1 at 5-54 to -55, 5-58 to -59 for
references to Keno Dam fish passage.
214 1 KLAMATH FINAL LICENSE APPLICATION, supra  note 206, § B2.4, at 2-7 (“Be- R
cause the Project reservoirs provide little active storage, [Upper Klamath Lake] pro-
vides the only meaningful storage in the basin to ameliorate high flow events.”).
215 The Klamath Hydroelectric Project’s fifty-year FERC license expired in the
spring of 2006.  Michael Milstein, Klamath Farmers Take on New Threat , OREGO-
NIAN (Portland), Jan. 21, 2005, at A1.  The license is now being extended annually by
FERC under the same terms and conditions while relicensing is pending.
216 In August of 1916, J. McKee, Vice-President of the California-Oregon Power
Company, the original owners of the dams, wrote to the Bureau of Indian Affairs:
We note that complaints have reached your office through the Klamath
Indian Reservation that the run of salmon in the Klamath River has been
interfered with by a dam which our company has under construction upon
the Klamath River.  In reply we beg to say that we expect that the said dam
will be completed by the end of the present year, 1916.  Ample provision
has been made in the plans for the dam for a fish ladder which will permit
unobstructed passage of fish up the Klamath River.
Nevertheless, when the dam was finally completed in 1918, the promises to the Kla-
math Tribes for fish passage facilities had been ignored. See LANE & LANE ASS’N,
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, THE COPCO DAMS AND
THE FISHERIES OF THE KLAMATH TRIBE 150-51 (1981) (on file with author).
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dards for most new licenses, and some sort of fish passage will
now be required as FERC considers PacifiCorp’s application.217
Estimates are that these dams block salmonid access to as
much as 570 stream-miles of once-occupied and productive
salmon habitat, which today could produce between 149,734 to
438,023 additional adult fish each year.218  But first the fish have
to be able to get there.
There are hopeful signs and a number of reports, studies, and
agency documents that may lead to an ultimate decision by either
PacifiCorp or FERC to decommission all or most of these Kla-
math Hydroelectric Project dams, including the following.
1. Strong Stands on Fish Passage, Recommendations for
Decommissioning
In March 2006, as a result of years of work and analysis,
NOAA Fisheries, as the foremost federal salmon-manager, for-
mally recommended full Klamath Hydroelectric Project dam re-
moval to FERC as the biologically best option to revive the
Klamath’s failing salmon runs.  NOAA Fisheries stated:
The Licensee shall develop and implement a plan to remove
the lower four Project dams (Iron Gate, Copco 2, Copco 1,
and J.C. Boyle dams), restore the riverine corridor, and bring
upstream and downstream fish passage facilities at Keno dam
into compliance with NMFS guidelines and criteria within ten
years of license issuance, expiration or surrender.219
Under its justification, NOAA Fisheries went on to add:
While NMFS is prescribing preliminary fishways under its au-
thority in Federal Power Act section 18, NMFS believes that
within this relicensing process the best alternative to contrib-
ute to restoration of all fish species of concern in the Klamath
watershed is the decommissioning and subsequent removal of
the four lower Project dams (Iron Gate, Copco 1 & 2, and J.C.
Boyle), combined with improvements in fish passage at Keno
217 See  Federal Power Act § 18, 16 U.S.C. § 811 (2006).  There is a provision for
applicant appeals and the right to propose alternatives to agency-proposed fish pas-
sage. Id.  However, PacifiCorp’s appeals and alternative prescription have been re-
jected. See  discussion infra  Part II.B.2.
218 C. W. Huntington, Aquatic Biologist, to Larry Dunsmoor, Biologist, Klamath
Tribes, Preliminary Estimates of the Recent and Historic Potential for Anadromous
Fish Production Above Iron Gate Dam 3, 12 (Apr. 5, 2004) (on file with author).
219 NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV. & U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., PRELIMI-
NARY FISH PRESCRIPTIONS C-5 (2006) [hereinafter COMMERCE PRELIMINARY FISH
PRESCRIPTIONS], available at  http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?
fileID=10985726.
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Dam.  The dam removal alternative is a superior alternative
from a fish passage, water quality, and habitat restoration
standpoint. . . .  Implementing this dam decommissioning and
dam removal alternative would go a long way toward resolving
decades of degradation where Klamath River salmon stocks
are concerned.220
Full four-dam removal was also recommended by Oregon and
California state agencies, all the Klamath Basin tribes, several
members of Congress, many NGO organizations, and the Hum-
boldt County Board of Supervisors.221  Of particular note, even
the PFMC, which manages all ocean salmon fisheries in federal
waters under the Magnuson-Stevens Act,222 formally endorsed
Klamath Hydroelectric Project decommissioning and removal as
its recommended option for restoring damaged fisheries.  The
PFMC noted that:
The value of ocean fisheries is high when Klamath natural
Chinook are abundant, but can be much lower when Klamath
fish constrain the catch of other healthy stocks.  The Council
estimates that between 1970 and 2004, the average annual per-
sonal income impacts of the recreational and commercial
ocean salmon fishery in the area where Klamath fish are found
amounted to $92 million.  The constraints on the fishery in
2006 caused by the need to protect Klamath River natural fall
chinook are expected to reduce the value of this fishery to less
than $33 million.  In contrast, the Klamath hydropower project
produces 163 megawatts with an annual net economic value of
$16.3 million.  NMFS notes that the “generating capacity pro-
vided through continued Project operations is nominal . . . rel-
ative to the watershed level of benefits to aquatic resources
and regional and national priorities for restoring anadromous
salmonids.
. . . .
The Council believes the proposed relicensing of this project
will have substantial adverse impacts on [essential fish habitat]
in the Klamath River.  The project causes harm to salmon
habitat; to the health of fish stocks; to commercial, recrea-
tional, and tribal fisheries; and to fishing communities along
the Oregon and California coasts and in the Klamath River
basin.  Consequently, the Council recommends that FERC or-
der the immediate decommissioning and removal of the four
220 Id.
221 See, e.g. , Letter from Eleven Members of the House of Representatives to
Joseph T. Kelliher, Chairman, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (May 2, 2006) (on
file with author); Letter from Mike Reed, President, Or. Chapter, Am. Fisheries
Soc’y, to Magalie R. Salas, Sec’y, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (Nov. 21, 2006)
(on file with author).
222 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(ii) (2006).
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\22-1\OEL102.txt unknown Seq: 57 14-AUG-07 15:35
2007] Klamath Basin 105
lower Klamath River dam structures and full restoration of
habitat affected by the dams and reservoirs.223
Unfortunately, NOAA Fisheries, state agencies, tribes, PFMC
and NGOs cannot compel FERC decommissioning, but can only
recommend it.224  Nevertheless, these recommendations will
have a great deal of persuasive power.  FERC should also con-
sider the damage these dams have done to other, potentially
more valuable, economic sectors such as the fishing industry.
However, NOAA Fisheries and USFWS can  compel construc-
tion of fish passage facilities for salmon, which none of these
dams currently possess.225  NOAA Fisheries therefore joined
with the USFWS to require stringent, volitional, fish-passage re-
quirements in these dams as a condition of any license renewal as
a backup option to full decommissioning.226  The Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) also has some limited prescriptive author-
ity, but only over the wild-and-scenic designated portions of the
river at and below J.C. Boyle Dam.227  BLM authority is thus
restricted to ramping-rate and flow issues at J.C. Boyle Dam that
would impact recreational uses of the river and river resources
just downstream on BLM-managed lands.
In fact, the estimated costs of retrofitting these nearly obsolete
dams to modern fish-passage standards could easily exceed their
net power-production value to the company.  If this is the case,
and PacifiCorp still refuses to decommission them, it is unlikely
that the public utility commissions (PUCs) of any of the six states
in which PacifiCorp operates would approve passing these costs
on to customers—not when dam removal would have been a far
cheaper option with respect to consumers.228  Any effort by
PacifiCorp to recover the costs from customers of its poor choice
223 Letter from Donald K. Hansen, Chairman, Pac. Fishery Mgmt. Council, to
Magalie R. Salas, Sec’y, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n 4-5 (Apr. 24, 2006), avail-
able at  http://www.pcouncil.org/habitat/habdocs/FERC_Klamath_M_Salas.pdf.
224 See  16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 811, 823d.
225 Id.  § 811.
226 See COMMERCE PRELIMINARY PRESCRIPTIONS, supra  note 219; see also U.S. R
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, COMMENTS, PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS, TERMS
AND CONDITIONS, AND PRESCRIPTIONS FOR FISHWAYS 2 (2006), available at  http://
elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=10986202.
227 See  16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (authorizing BLM to impose conditions “necessary for
the adequate protection and utilization” of BLM lands).
228 PacifiCorp (also doing business as Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power)
operates in California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Wyoming, and Utah, serving
roughly 1.6 million customers.  PacifiCorp, PacifiCorp Facts, http://www.pacificorp.
com/Navigation/Navigation3877.html (last visited May 5, 2007).
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to retain Klamath Dams in the face of cheaper and more effec-
tive options would be hotly contested.
In late January 2007, NOAA Fisheries, the USFWS and the
BLM all filed final prescriptions under the Federal Power Act.229
These final prescriptions were nearly identical to all prior prelim-
inary prescriptions and recommendations filed in March 2006,
with only minor changes.  All three agencies soundly rejected
PacifiCorp’s proposed “trap and haul” alternative as less protec-
tive of the resource than full fish-passage and less likely to result
in successful reintroduction of anadromous fish back into the up-
per Basin.230  These filings make it inevitable that FERC will ulti-
mately be required to adopt the agencies’ volitional fish-passage
requirements in any final new FERC license.
2. Favorable Rulings in the Energy Policy Act Appeals
Until 2005, the power of NOAA Fisheries and the USFWS to
require fish passage in a FERC relicensings was absolute.  If a
federal agency required fish passage, it was an automatic condi-
tion of any future FERC license and binding on FERC, even if
FERC disagreed.231
The hydropower industry, which is facing thousands of dam
relicensings in the next two decades, detests this mandatory con-
ditioning authority, and finally succeeded in reducing that au-
thority in 2005 under the Federal Power Act, via amendments to
the Energy Policy Act.232
229 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS ACT SECTION 7 DETER-
MINATION FOR THE UPPER KLAMATH WILD AND SCENIC REACH (2007) [hereinafter
BLM WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS ACT DETERMINATION], available at  http://elibrary.
ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=11239992; U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
KLAMATH MODIFIED FISHWAY PRESCRIPTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS
(2007) [hereinafter COMMERCE’S MODIFIED FISHWAY PRESCRIPTIONS], available at
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=11238826; U.S. DEP’T
OF THE INTERIOR, MODIFIED TERMS AND CONDITIONS, AND PRESCRIPTIONS FOR
FISHWAYS (2007) [hereinafter INTERIOR MODIFIED TERMS AND CONDITIONS], avail-
able at  http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=11239696.
230 This is the legal standard that must now be met under the Energy Policy Act
alternative-conditions parallel-regulations at 43 C.F.R. § 45.73 (Interior) and 50
C.F.R. § 211.73 (Commerce).  Final Prescriptions were filed in January 2007. See
BLM WILD AND SCENIC RIVERS ACT DETERMINATION, supra  note 229; COM- R
MERCE’S MODIFIED FISHWAY PRESCRIPTIONS, supra  note 229; INTERIOR MODIFIED R
TERMS AND CONDITIONS, supra  note 229. R
231 See  16 U.S.C. § 811 (2000).
232 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 241(c), 119 Stat. 594, 674
(codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
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The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided for an intermediate
trial-type, fact-finding hearing and appeals process, on a very
stringent ninety-day timeline, for all fish-passage conditions that
a license applicant disputes.233  This provision was retroactively
applied to the Klamath under newly adopted rules.234
In the first test of this new appeals procedure, PacifiCorp for-
mally appealed the fish-passage conditions on numerous
grounds.235  Many tribal, conservation, and fishing industry
groups intervened in these expedited proceedings to defend the
conditions.236
After three months of intensive preparation coordinated be-
tween the conservation and fishing groups, the tribes, and the
state and federal agencies, the administrative appeal went to a
week-long trial in August 2006.  Opposed was PacifiCorp as well
as Siskiyou County, the County being concerned about the im-
pact of dam removal on property owners surrounding Copco
Lake and the impact on whitewater-rafting businesses.237  At
stake was whether “volitional fish passage” would be imposed by
the federal agencies, or whether the “trap-and-haul” alternative
proposed by PacifiCorp that would leave the dams in place
would prevail.238
233 Id.
234 These new rules are now at 43 C.F.R. pt. 43 (Interior) and 50 C.F.R. pt. 211
(Commerce).
235 See  Letter from Beth S. Ginsberg, Stoel Rives LLP, to Chief, Habitat Prot.
Div., Office of Habitat Conservation, Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (Apr. 27, 2006),
available at  http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=11016462
(addressing PacifiCorp’s submission of documents related to a challenge to fish-pas-
sage conditions).
236 Both the PCFFA and the IFR were also intervenors in that case. Id.
237 Siskiyou County was separately represented as a plaintiff-intervenor primarily
to challenge BLM Issue 19 regarding the impact of changed J.C. Boyle peaking
reach flows and how that would affect whitewater rafting and flyfishing, but other-
wise played only a minor role. See, e.g. , Comments and Recommendations of Sis-
kiyou County at 2, In re  PacifiCorp License Renewal (Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n Mar. 29, 2006), available at  http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/open-
nat.asp?fileID=10985968.  On November 15, 2006, the U.S. Coast Guard, which held
hearings on the matter, posted the full administrative record on the FERC eLibrary
website under both Docket Nos. P-2082-027 and P-2082-000.  The FERC eLibrary
site may be accessed at http://www.ferc.gov.
238 PacifiCorp simultaneously filed its Energy Policy Act administrative appeal of
the Service’s volitional fish-passage Preliminary Prescriptions and its own Alterna-
tive Prescriptions on CD with FERC on April 28, 2006. See  Letter from Anne K.
Dailey, Troutman Sanders LLP, to Magalie Roman Salas, Sec’y, Fed. Energy Regu-
latory Comm’n (Apr. 28, 2006), http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.
asp?fileID=11016462; Letter from Beth S. Ginsberg to Habitat Prot. Div. Chief,
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On September 27, 2006, the administrative law judge ruled in
favor of the federal and state agency positions on every major
issue, including all issues directly relevant to fish passage.  The
agencies lost on only a few minor points, mostly dealing with im-
pacts on whitewater rafting.239  This decision was a vindication of
the agencies’ prescriptions, and seriously undercut PacifiCorp’s
efforts to substitute a more primitive trap-and-haul fish-passage
program.
3. A Very Favorable Sediment Study
Whenever any dam is breached, there are always concerns
about trapped sediments washing downstream. There had been
speculation that there might be serious problems with either the
volumes of sediments trapped behind the dams, or the toxic na-
ture of these sediments, that could make dam decommissioning
prohibitively expensive or dangerous.240  PacifiCorp, however,
refused to conduct the necessary studies to determine whether
this was a problem or not as part of its relicensing application
process, and for several months this issue was at an impasse.241
However, in September 2006 the California Coastal Conser-
vancy released a comprehensive sediment study with results
favorable to decommissioning the dams.  This study found (1)
supra  note 235.  Had the Energy Policy Act appeal of PacifiCorp ultimately pre- R
vailed, PacifiCorp’s Alternative Prescription (i.e., “trap-and-haul”) would have been
the alternative likely adopted by FERC.
239 See In re  Klamath Hydroelectric Project 85-87, No. 2006-NMFS-0001 (NOAA
Fisheries Sept. 27, 2006), available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/open-
nat.asp?fileID=11146718.
240 See, e.g. , KLAMATH HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT DEIS, supra  note 4, § 5.2.21, at R
5-58 (“However, if sediments in Copco or Iron Gate reservoirs are found to be con-
taminated to the extent that release of the sediments to downstream areas could not
reasonably occur, the costs for dredging and upland disposal of contaminated sedi-
ments could be exorbitant . . . .”).
241 PacifiCorp took the position that since it was not proposing dam decommis-
sioning, it had no obligation to conduct sediment or other studies potentially leading
up to decommissioning.  This position was disputed by the agencies, which uniformly
took the position that a complete study record for all options was needed for alter-
natives analysis as part of the NEPA process and repeatedly asked for these addi-
tional studies. See OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON
THE FINAL LICENSE APPLICATION passim (2003), available at  http://elibrary.ferc.gov/
idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=10127009; Letter from William D. Bettenberg,
Dir., Office of Policy Analysis, Dep’t of the Interior, to Magalie R. Salas, Sec’y, Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n & Toby Freeman & Todd Olsen, PacifiCorp passim
(Apr. 26, 2004), available at  http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?file
ID=10127494.
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there are no significant toxic contamination problems in sedi-
ments trapped behind the dams; and (2) the amount and position
of retained sediment would not become a significant problem
with decommissioning and removal but would largely wash
through the river system within a single season without signifi-
cantly jeopardizing downriver ecosystems and salmon runs.242
There are also a number of mitigation measures in terms of in-
creasing Project flow-through levels and flow timing available to
limit sediment surges to a short duration and to minimize adverse
impacts of the sediment surge on the lower river.243  The river is
also so spawning-sediment starved for at least fifty miles below
Iron Gate Dam that there would be a net benefit for salmon over
the long run, above and beyond that from opening up blocked
habitat areas.244
This means that decommissioning of the major dams in the
Klamath hydropower system would be relatively easier and far
less expensive than originally thought, and overcomes a major
PacifiCorp objection to dam removal.
4. The Draft Environmental Impact Statement Concludes Dam
Removal Is Feasible
In September 2006, FERC published its long-awaited draft en-
vironmental impact statement (DEIS) analyzing the various op-
tions for relicensing.  One of the four options under
consideration is partial dam removal.245  This is a rarity in FERC
DEIS documents and shows that serious consideration is being
given to dam removal in some form.  The removal option ana-
lyzed includes the total removal of the two largest and worst
dams in the system—Iron Gate and Copco No. 1.246  The re-
242 Letter from Samuel Schuchat, Executive Officer, Cal. Coastal Conservancy, to
Magalie Roman Salas, Sec’y, Fed. Regulatory Comm’n 1 (Sept. 22, 2006), available
at  http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=11142980; see also
Memorandum from Yantao Cui, Hydraulic Engineer, Stillwater Engineering, to
Dennis Gathard, Gathard Engineering Consulting (Sept. 13, 2006), available at
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=11142984 (recom-
mending the removal of coffer dam one year after the process that would release
sediment).
243 Memorandum from Yantao Cui, supra  note 242. R
244 On sediment starvation of lower river below Iron Gate Dam, see KLAMATH
HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT DEIS, supra  note 4, § 3.3, at 3-5 to -23. R
245 Id.  § 4.6, at 4-4 to -7.
246 Id.  These two dams have by far the largest reservoirs and therefore are the
source of most of the water-quality problems created by the Project as a whole.
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moval would, according to FERC’s own analysis, correct many of
the serious water-quality problems within the system, many of
which jeopardize the health of the Klamath’s salmon runs far
downstream.247  FERC also concluded that the two-dam removal
option it analyzed was far cheaper than retaining these two dams
with full, volitional fish-passage.248
That DEIS is flawed, however, in several ways, including: (1)
failure to analyze the full decommissioning and removal (the
four-dam removal) option; (2) failure to take into account the
rulings issued by an administrative law judge two days after the
DEIS was released; and (3) failure to factor in the Coastal Con-
servancy sediment study, also released shortly after the DEIS
was issued.  These and numerous other flaws have prompted
many calls for the DEIS to be withdrawn, rewritten, and reissued
in light of this important new information.  The formal comment
period on the DEIS closed December 1, 2006.  A final EIS is due
out after April 30, 2007, though these deadlines often slip.249
5. Probable Strong State Water Quality Certification
Requirements
In order to get a FERC license, every project must be certified
under section 401(c) of the CWA by the affected states as meet-
ing state water-quality requirements.250  Thus, FERC is bound by
whatever mitigation measures are required by the states to meet
state water-quality standards.  This state water-quality certifica-
tion process is the states’ only mandatory conditioning authority
under the Federal Power Act.
The ability of the Klamath River below the dams to support
salmon is severely constrained by high water temperatures, poor
water quality, poor dissolved-oxygen levels, excessive ammonia,
toxic and other algae blooms, nutrient concentrations in the
warm-water reservoirs, and related fish parasites and diseases
that thrive in such conditions.  All these conditions can be traced
to, or are exacerbated by, the Klamath dams.251  Most of both of
the upper and lower parts of the river are listed under the CWA
247 See id.  § 3.3.2.2.2, at 3-150 to -153.
248 Id.  § 4.0, at 4-2 tbl.4-3.
249 A final EIS is generally issued within ninety days of the filing of the final
agency prescriptions.  These prescriptions were filed January 30, 2007.
250 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2006).
251 See KLAMATH HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT DEIS, supra  note 4, § 3.3.2, at 3-58 R
to -155.
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section 303(d) as water-quality impaired for a host of these and
other limiting factors.252
In recent years there has been increasing concern with the
spread of highly toxic blue-green algae throughout the dams’ res-
ervoirs.  In particular, a nasty little species known as Microcystis
aeruginosa253 —a poisonous blue-green algal  cyanobacterium
that creates a potent human liver toxin, microcystin—is now per-
vasive throughout Iron Gate, Copco, and Keno reservoirs,
though all but unknown above those reservoirs.  Even small ex-
posures to the toxin microcystin can lead to serious liver damage
in humans.254  This potent liver toxin also bioaccumulates in fish,
creating serious health concerns for recreational and tribal fisher-
men, fish populations, commercial fishermen, and ultimately
consumers.255
During July and August 2006, water samples were taken at sev-
eral locations in the Iron Gate and Copco reservoirs that found
Microcystis aeruginosa everywhere sampled at levels of serious
public health concern.256  At one location in Copco reservoir, the
levels of the toxic algae observed exceeded the World Health Or-
ganization’s moderate-risk-exposure standard by more than 3900
times.257  According to the researchers conducting these studies,
these levels are “among the highest recorded in the world.”258
This toxic blue-green algae species thrives in the nutrient-rich
warm waters of reservoirs behind the dams, but was not found to
252 See supra  note 147.  As a result of this impaired waters classification, a number R
of Klamath TMDL development processes are now ongoing. See infra  note 312. R
253 See KLAMATH HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT DEIS, supra  note 4, § 3.3.2.1, at 3- R
117.
254 Microcystin can cause a wide variety of human health problems, including se-
vere liver damage and death. See  Maria G. Antoniou et al., Cyanotoxins: New Gen-
eration of Water Contaminants , 131 J. ENVTL. ENGINEERING 1239, 1239 (2005); S.
Pichardo et al., Toxic Effects Produced by Microcystins From a Natural Cyanobacter-
ial Bloom and a Microcystis aeruginosa Isolated Strain on the Fish Cell Lines RTG-2
and PLHC-1 , 51 ARCHIVES OF ENVTL. CONTAMINATION & TOXICOLOGY 86, 86-87
(2006).
255 See  V.F. Magalhães et al., Microcystins (Cyanobacteria Hepatotoxins) Bioac-
cumulation in Fish and Crustaceans from Sepetiba Bay (Brasil, R.J.) , 42 TOXICON
289, 289-90 (2003).
256 Memorandum from Jacob Kann of Aquatic Ecosystem Sciences on Cya-
nobacteria Results from July 13th and 27th, 2006, at 1 (Aug. 8, 2006) (on file with
author) [hereinafter August 8th Memorandum]; Memorandum from Jacob Kann of
Aquatic Ecosystem Sciences on Cyanobacteria Results from August 7th-8th, 2006, at
1 (Aug. 21, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter August 21st Memorandum].
257 August 21st Memorandum, supra  note 256, at 2 & tbl.1. R
258 Id.  at 2.
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any significant degree anywhere above the Keno Reservoir.259
The microcystin toxins from these algae blooms, however, wash
downstream, and have already been observed accumulating in
the livers of some lower river Chinook salmon.260
PacifiCorp applied in March 2006 to both Oregon and Califor-
nia for CWA state section 401(c) water-quality certifications.
The deadline for state agency action on that application would
ordinarily have been March 2007, one year from the original ap-
plication date.  However, the state agencies have noted a number
of serious flaws in the applications, including lack of monitoring
data on Microcystis aeruginosa  and its related toxin microcystin.
In lieu of outright denial, however, PacifiCorp’s original certifica-
tion application  was  withdrawn on February 28, 2007, and later
resubmitted that same day and in the same form, technically re-
starting the one-year decision clock.261  However, by letter dated
February 26, 2007, the California Water Board has now required
considerable additional water-quality monitoring data and infor-
mation for the new application, or it will ultimately be denied.262
This reiterative process could happen several times, and each
withdrawal and re-submittal pushes state 401(c) certification-de-
cision deadlines into the future by another year.
6. California Energy Commission Study Concludes the
Klamath Dams Are Not Cost Effective
In December 2006, the California Energy Commission (CEC)
released what is likely to be an influential economic analysis of
259 Id.
260 Yurok Tribe Biologists, Address at the Fish Health Conference (Jan. 31, 2007).
For more information on this unpublished study, contact the Yurok Tribe of Califor-
nia, Department of Natural Resources, 15900 Hwy. 101 North, Klamath, Cal. 95548,
(707) 482-1350.  As a result of these concerns, on May 2, 2007, a group of lower river
tribal members and coastal commercial salmon fishermen filed a private nuisance
and unlawful business practices suit against PacifiCorp to force cleanup of the toxic
algae problems at the dams. See  Complaint, McConnell v. PacifiCorp, No. 07-2382-
WHA (N.D. Cal. filed May 2, 2007).
261 See  Letter from Elizabeth Lawson, Cal. Water Res. Control Eng’r, State Water
Res. Control Bd., to Cory Scott, Project Manager, PacifiCorp Energy (Mar. 20,
2007), available at  http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=
11316001.  A similar withdrawal and re-submittal was done in Oregon.
262 Letter from Elizabeth Lawson, Water Res. Control Eng’r, Cal. Water Res.
Control Bd., to Cory Scott, Project Manager, PacifiCorp Energy 11 (Feb. 26, 2007),
available at  http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=11289671.
A similar letter was issued by Oregon DEQ but not filed on the FERC web site as of
this writing.  It is available from Oregon DEQ.
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the dams.263  The CEC Report shows that even under future fuel
and power costs estimated by PacifiCorp itself, four-dam decom-
missioning in the Klamath would still be about $101 million
cheaper than retaining the dams and retrofitting them to modern
fish-passage standards.264
This means that if PacifiCorp retains these dams, it faces a high
risk of operating them at a loss as well as a potential refusal by
the state public utility commissions to allow these costs to be
passed to customers.265  If PacifiCorp cannot pass on the costs,
the company’s shareholders would have to pony up these costs.
This creates a stronger economic incentive for PacifiCorp to sim-
ply order the dams decommissioned.266
7. Decoupling the Dams from Irrigation Power Rates
Since 1917, a select group of federal Klamath Irrigation Project
irrigators, as well as a few now located outside the Project, have
enjoyed long-term power contracts tied to the Klamath Hydroe-
lectric Project that provided highly subsidized irrigation power
prices fixed at 1917 rates, which today are only about one-twelfth
263 CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, ECONOMIC MODELING OF RELICENSING AND DECOM-
MISSIONING OPTIONS FOR THE KLAMATH BASIN HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT (2006)
[hereinafter CEC REPORT], available at  http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/
opennat.asp?fileID=11197393.
264 Id.  at 6.  PacifiCorp has since filed a rebuttal to the CEC Report with FERC.
See DANIEL G. HANSEN ET AL., CHRISTENSEN ASSOCS. ENERGY CONSULTING,
EVALUATION OF THE KLAMATH PROJECT ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS MODEL (2007),
available at  http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/ opennat.asp?fileID=11284928;
Letter from Cory Scott, Project Manager, PacifiCorp Energy, to Philis Posey, Acting
Sec’y, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (Mar. 12, 2007), available at  http://elibrary.
ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=11284927; see also  Letter from B.B.
Blevins, Executive Dir., Cal. Energy Comm’n, to Philis Posey, Acting Sec’y, Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n (Apr. 19, 2007), available at  http://www.energy.ca.gov/
2007publications/CEC-700-2007-004/CEC-700-2007-004-REV1.PDF (responding to
criticisms made in the PacifiCorp rebuttal).
265 Since a power-plant license is considered a system-wide benefit, these costs
would ordinarily be passed on to customers, but PacifiCorp would need consent
from the PUCs of all six states in which it does business in order to effect rate hikes.
266 It should be noted, however, that decommissioning a dam is not the same thing
as removal of the structures from a river and restoring the river to its original condi-
tion.  There have been instances of dams decommissioned (i.e., they cease function-
ing as power producers) but then being more or less abandoned and never removed.
In the Klamath, the dams would have to be both decommissioned and removed in
order to fully restore the river.  FERC would retain jurisdiction over a decommis-
sioned dam through a non-power FERC license.
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to one-seventeenth the power rates paid by all other similarly
situated irrigators.267
These power rates, originally set in 1917 at then-market power
rates when the dams were first licensed, were never adjusted for
inflation, so over the years the gap between what all other simi-
larly situated irrigators were paying for irrigation power and
what these select few were paying continued to grow.  By 2007
this subsidy had grown to about $10 million per year, a sum un-
derwritten by all other PacifiCorp customers.268  These customers
included farmers not receiving the subsidy who were forced to
compete with subsidized Klamath Project farmers in the same
markets, selling the same types of crops, at a distinct economic
disadvantage.269  Project subsidized rates were also well below
the costs to PacifiCorp of creating and delivering this power,
which meant that PacifiCorp lost considerable money on the
transaction every year.270  Until recently, this direct connection
between the existence of the Klamath Hydroelectric Power Pro-
ject and subsidies to the local irrigation power rates tied these
two interests directly together.
267 See Editorial, No More Cut-Rate Power , REG.-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Apr. 17,
2006, at A10. The Project spans the Oregon-California border, and the standard
power rate tariffs for each state are slightly different, hence the spread.  Also, loca-
tion within the Project and power usage create slight rate variations from user to
user.
268 PUC staff noted in testimony “The cost for PacifiCorp’s system of transmis-
sion, distribution, and generation facilities to serve the Klamath Basin irrigators far
exceeds the rates of the historical contracts. . . .  The deficit in revenue required
between what Klamath irrigators would pay under [current rates] and the rates in
the historical contracts is being covered by PacifiCorp’s other Oregon customers.
This represents an annual transfer-of-wealth from PacifiCorp’s Oregon customers to
Klamath Basin irrigators of $7.7 million . . . .”  Opening Testimony of William A.
McNamee 17-18, In re  Pacific Power & Light, No. UE-170 (Or. Pub. Utils. Comm’n
Jan. 17, 2006), available at  http://edocs.puc.state.or.us/efdocs/HTB/ue170htb92827.
pdf; see Rebuttal Testimony of William A. McNamee 16-17, In re  Pacific Power &
Light, No. UE-170 (Or. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Feb. 6, 2006), available at  http://edocs.
puc.state.or.us/efdocs/HTB/ue170htb104512.pdf; see also Direct Testimony of James
V. McCarthy 10-13, 17-18, In re  Pacific Power & Light, No. UE-170 (Or. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n Jan. 17, 2006), available at  http://edocs.puc.state.or.us/efdocs/HTB/ue170
htb143017.pdf (showing approximately $10 million/year annual subsidy when all fac-
tors are considered).  The Oregon Public Utilities Commission (OPUC) rate case in
which Klamath Irrigation Project irrigation rates were adjusted from 1917-era rates
is OPUC Docket No. UE-170.  The entire administrative record of this case is avail-
able by docket number at http://apps.puc.state.or.us/edockets/search.asp and can be
accessed by searching for Docket No. UE-170.
269 Direct Testimony of James V. McCarthy, supra  note 268, at 13. R
270 See supra  notes 268-69. R
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But in April 2006, the fifty-year term of the last extension of
these long-term power contracts finally ended.271  As these con-
tracts were coming to a close, Klamath Water Users Association
(KWUA), the Off-Project Water Users Association, and the DOI
sought to have these rates, no longer provided by any contract,
extended in both Oregon and California through their respective
state PUCs.272
Much has changed in the utilities arena since 1917 when these
contracts were first signed.  For one thing, the West Coast is now
covered by a consolidated power grid and it is no longer possible
to trace Project power specifically back to the Klamath dams as
in 1917.  Also, under modernized state laws these 1917 long-term
power contracts are now almost certainly illegal as discriminatory
rates under both Oregon273 and California law.274
As a consequence, both state public utilities commissions re-
jected irrigators’ claims that these unique subsidies were justified
by any difference in operations or power usage by the irrigators.
As a consequence, in April 2006, the Oregon PUC ordered these
previously subsidized rates to move to market rates over a seven-
year transition period.275  A December 2006 decision, issued by
the California PUC, has similarly denied all KWUA and DOI
claims to continued power subsidies and continued their move to
market rates over a four-year transition period.276  While litiga-
tion over these power rates subsidies is not quite over,277 these
271 In re  Pac. Power & Light, Or. Pub. Utilities Comm’n Order No. 06-172, at 1
(Apr. 12, 2006), available at  http://apps.puc.state.or.us/orders/2006ords/06-172.pdf.
272 See  Motion to Strike Testimony at 2-4, In re  PacifiCorp Proposed Rate In-
crease, Investigation No. 06-02-002 (Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm’n July 19, 2006), avail-
able at  http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/EFILE/MOTION/58199.pdf; In re  Pac. Power &
Light, Or. Pub. Utilities Comm’n Order No. 06-172, at 2.
273 See OR. REV. STAT. § 757.325 (2005).
274 See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 453(a), (c) (West 2007).
275 In re  Pac. Power & Light, Or. Pub. Utilities Comm’n Order No. 06-172, at 1.
The seven-year transition period was required pursuant to Oregon Senate Bill 81,
adopted in 2005 to provide this gradual ramping of rates to standard tariffs. See id.
at 1, 16, 18.
276 In re  PacifiCorp, No. U-901-E (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Dec. 14, 2006), availa-
ble at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_DECISION/63020.pdf.
277 The Off-Project Water Users Association has since filed suit against
PacifiCorp in Oregon, seeking judicial restoration of 1917 contract power rates on
the theory that since their 1917 contract carried no specific termination date, these
rates could never be terminated or changed. See Klamath Off-Project Water Users
Ass’n v. PacifiCorp, Civil No. 06-04877 (Cir. Ct. Klamath County, Or., filed Nov. 29,
2006).  However, the PUC has asserted authority to terminate this contract after the
“reasonable” term of fifty years (its last term of renewal) at the same time as the
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rulings effectively de-couple the Project from any economic stake
in the Hydroelectric Project’s continued existence.
Meanwhile, on a separate track, the DOI and KWUA have
tried to claim that because their long-term power contracts were
timed to run in parallel with the fifty-year FERC license, they
were in fact a license condition that should be extended automat-
ically with every subsequent one-year temporary extension of the
dams’ FERC license.278  FERC, however, vetoed that idea and
noted that these power rates were all provided pursuant to a
long-term power contract, not a license condition, and that this
power contract expired by its own terms in April 2006.279  A later
petition for rehearing was filed by KWUA, which represents Pro-
ject-dependent irrigators and water districts, but was also de-
nied.280  KWUA then appealed the latter adverse ruling directly
to the D.C. Circuit, where it is now being briefed.281
This appeal is likely to fail, for several reasons.  First, the
power rates were clearly provided for in a contract that has now
expired, not in the FERC license itself.  The more fundamental
and more interesting reason it is likely to fail, however, is that
with very few exceptions, none of which are relevant here, the
Federal Power Act gives jurisdiction to FERC only over rates for
wholesale  power sold in interstate commerce, while leaving au-
thority to set retail  power rates strictly to the states.  For in-
stance, the Federal Power Act states:
It is declared that the business of transmitting and selling elec-
tric energy for ultimate distribution to the public is affected
with a public interest, and that Federal regulation of matters
relating to generation . . . of that part of such business which
consists of the transmission of electric energy in interstate
commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate
commerce is necessary in the public interest, such Federal reg-
other contract and the Klamath Hydroelectric Project fifty-year license itself.  This
suit is unlikely to prevail against the PUC decision and Oregon’s bar against discrim-
inatory rates of this sort. See OR. REV. STAT § 757.325.
278 Order Denying Petition for Declaratory Order, In re  PacifiCorp Project Nos.
2082-039 & 2082-040, at 1 (Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n Jan. 20, 2006), available
at  http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/011906/H-1.pdf.
279 Id.
280 Order Denying Rehearing, In re  PacifiCorp Project No. 2082-041, at 1 (Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n Apr. 20, 2006), available at  http://www.ferc.gov/whats-
new/comm-meet/042006/H-5.pdf.
281 Klamath Water Users Ass’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, No. 06-1212
(D.C. Cir. filed June 19, 2006).  Intervenors included PacifiCorp, the Pacific Coast
Federation of Fishermen’s Associations and the Hoopa Valley Tribe of California.
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ulation, however, to extend only to those matters which are not
subject to regulation by the States .282
The Supreme Court also made this jurisdictional division clear in
Federal Power Commission v. Conway Corp. , in which the Court
ruled that “[t]he Commission has no power to prescribe the rates
for retail sales of power companies.”283  In order for FERC to
reinstate highly preferential power rates of the sort asked for by
the KWUA, it would have to preempt all state PUC authority
over these types of intra-state retail rates, and impose a state rate
that is patently discriminatory under California and Oregon state
law.284
In any event, unless the KWUA or other Upper Klamath Ba-
sin irrigation interests ultimately prevail, they no longer have any
real economic interest in the fight over whether the Klamath
dams are ultimately decommissioned and removed.  This elimi-
nates a potential major hurdle in the process of Klamath River
restoration.
8. Hope for a Negotiated FERC Settlement
FERC’s authority to deny a new license (in effect ordering
decommissioning) when circumstances warrant, though used
rarely, is nevertheless well rooted in its existing authority.  FERC
itself noted:
After examining the legislative history and the relevant statu-
tory provisions, the Commission concludes that it has the legal
authority to deny a new license at the time of relicensing if it
determines that, even with ample use of its conditioning au-
thority, no license can be fashioned that will comport with the
statutory standard under section 10(a) of the Federal Power
Act (the Act) and other applicable law.285
. . . .
. . . The Commission has concluded that it has the power to
take steps necessary to assure that the public interest is suita-
282 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
283 Fed. Power Comm’n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 276 (1976); see also  N.
States Power Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 176 F.3d 1090, 1093-96 (8th
Cir. 1999) (“FERC acknowledges that it cannot permissibly affect state regulation
of retail rates and practices. . . .  Congress has drawn a ‘bright line’ between state
and federal regulation.”).
284 See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 453(a), (c) (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 757.325 (2005).
285 Policy Statement Regarding Project Decommissioning at Relicensing, 60 Fed.
Reg. 339, 340 (Jan. 4, 1995).
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bly protected, including, in the rare case, requiring removal of
the project dam.286
. . . .
. . . Given this history, it is the Commission’s view that, in
those cases where, even with ample use of its conditioning au-
thority, a license still cannot be fashioned that will comport
with the statutory standard under section 10(a), the Commis-
sion has the power to deny a license.287
. . . .
The possibility that a project may have to shut down is not a
legitimate basis for the Commission to ignore its obligations to
impose necessary environmental conditions.288
Most importantly, FERC has clearly stated that economic viabil-
ity of a project is not the most important factor in a decision to
relicense, but only one of many to consider.  License conditions
do not become unreasonable simply because a marginal project
can no longer be economically viable under such conditions.289  It
is FERC’s job to protect the public interest, not to guarantee
profits for license applicants:
There is no merit to the suggestion by some industry commen-
tators that a condition in a power license is per se  unreasona-
ble if, as a result of imposing the condition, the project is no
longer economically viable.  The statute calls for a balancing
of various development and nondevelopment interests, and
those commenters’ position would elevate power and other
development interests far above the environmental concerns.
It would mean that severe environmental damage would have
to be accepted in order to protect even a very marginal hydro-
power project.  The Commission does not read the Federal
Power Act to compel such a result.  As the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit recently observed: “[T]here can be no
guarantee of profitability of water power projects under the
Federal Power Act; profitability is at risk from a number of
variable factors, and values other than profitability require ap-
propriate consideration.”290
Nevertheless, what may be accomplished though the regular
FERC process is quite limited.  In the past, the authority of
FERC to order dams decommissioned has been ambiguous and
has almost never been used without a prior settlement agreement
286 Id.
287 Id.  at 343.
288 Id.
289 Id.  at 340.
290 Id.  at 343 & n.31 (citing Wis. Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 32 F.3d 1165, 1168 (7th Cir. 1994)).
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consented to by the applicant company.291  Should the FERC
ever assert this authority unilaterally, the hydropower industry
would surely challenge it with years of litigation.
Mindful that the FERC was created to license dams and is
loath to decommission any against the wishes of the applicant,
confidential multi-stakeholder settlement negotiations have been
ongoing for over two years that parties believe still give the best
hope of achieving a more inclusive settlement, incorporating
both dam decommissioning as well as meaningful river restora-
tion.292  Agency support for decommissioning helps enormously
in these negotiations.  However, the FERC process alone cannot
deal with the other water and habitat-restoration issues plaguing
the Klamath Basin that could be incorporated in a broader
settlement.
C. Correcting Long-Term Klamath Water Problems
Diversion of water is potentially one of the most serious factors
adversely affecting salmon in western Oregon and northern
California.293
The other major Klamath Basin problem is widespread over-
appropriation of its limited water resources.  There are more le-
gally allowed diversions of water from the Klamath River than
can be met and still support healthy populations of salmonids.
Efforts to restore more balance and fairness to existing water
allocations so that fishing communities and commercially valua-
ble fisheries may survive, and to work toward a sustainable
rebalancing of the water demands of this drought-prone Basin,
have been hard-fought battles.  Most of these battles have been
driven by various ESA listings for fish, although that battle is
now shifting somewhat to the CWA.  The major milestones of
that long-running water battle are described below.
291 See  Lee Emery, A Review of Non-Federal Hydropower Dams Removed
Under FERC’s Regulatory Authority (on file with author).  Between 1963 and Feb-
ruary 2001, according to FERC records, the agency dealt with 1009 dam relicenses
and 597 exemptions, out of which only 11 projects were ultimately decommis-
sioned—considerably less than 1% of the total. Id.
292 Personal knowledge of the author.  The PCFFA is a party to these
negotiations.
293 BOTKIN ET AL., supra  note 18, at 101. R
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1. 2002-12 Biological Opinion Water Flows Litigation Ruling
In July 2003, a federal district court in northern California
ruled in favor of Klamath fishery interests in a major Klamath
water-allocation case.294  This case was brought following the
massive fish-kill of 2002 that devastated the lower river and seri-
ously damaged its fisheries for years to come.295  The 2002 fish-
kill was triggered by near-record low flows in the lower river al-
lowed under the ten-year coho salmon BiOp, several provisions
of which were invalidated by the court.296
In an important victory on appeal, the Ninth Circuit invali-
dated the remainder of the 2002-12 Coho BiOp as well, in partic-
ular a provision that allowed the gradual phase-in of much higher
target flows necessary to prevent jeopardy until 2010—by which
time, as the Ninth Circuit noted, the coho might well be ex-
tinct.297  The Ninth Circuit then ordered the lower court to craft
injunctive relief accordingly to establish target flows
immediately.298
On remand, the district court imposed full minimum-target
flows by injunction, per the Ninth Circuit’s instructions, to last
until a new ESA section 7 consultation can occur and a new Kla-
math River BiOp can be adopted for the impacts of the Project
on lower river coho salmon—an event likely to occur by the
spring of 2008.299  These flows guarantee at least basic survival
flows to the lower Klamath River to protect fragile fish runs as
they recover from the impacts of the 2002 massive fish-kill.
These additional flows will also help mitigate serious water-qual-
ity and disease problems exacerbated by the Klamath dams.
294 See  Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
No. CO2-02006-SBA, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13745 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2003), rev’d
on other grounds , 426 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2005).
295 See supra  notes 182-96 and accompanying text. R
296 See supra  notes 45-46 and accompanying text. R
297 Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426
F.3d 1082, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 2005).
298 Id.  at 1095.
299 Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, No.
C02-2006-SBA, 2006 WL 798920, *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2006) This is the current
schedule according to NOAA Fisheries Arcata, Cal. Field Office staff.
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The injunction ordering minimum instream fish flows was
again appealed to the Ninth Circuit, this time by KWUA as an
intervenor.300  NOAA Fisheries dismissed its initial appeal.
2. Determining What Water Fish Need: The Hardy Flow Study
In the meantime, in October 2006 a long-awaited final study of
flow needs for salmon below Iron Gate Dam was released.  This
study, Evaluation of Instream Flow Needs in the Lower Klamath
Basin , was released by Dr. Thomas B. Hardy and a team of
scientists at the Institute for Natural Systems Engineering at
Utah State University, and is thus referred to as the Hardy Flow
Study.301
Efforts to scientifically determine how much water lower-river
fish actually need to survive have been threatening to many
water-user interests and agencies in the upper Basin.  The Hardy
Flow Study was first proposed in 1996 and finally commissioned
and funded, against the efforts of Upper Klamath Basin efforts to
block it from 1996 onward.302  Bowing to political pressure to kill
the study, funding was later delayed, and then cut off entirely, by
Bush administration political appointees in 2002 and 2003, pro-
voking a loud protest from Congress.303  Funding was restored
shortly thereafter, but a competing study was then commissioned
300 The KWUA appeal ultimately failed, and was rejected by the Ninth Circuit on
March 26, 2007.  Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclama-
tion, No. 06-16296, 2007 WL 901580 (9th Cir. Mar. 26, 2007).
301 THOMAS B. HARDY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, EVALUATION OF
INSTREAM FLOW NEEDS IN THE LOWER KLAMATH RIVER (2006) [hereinafter
HARDY FLOW STUDY], available at  http://www.engineering.usu.edu/uwrl/inse/kla-
math/FinalReport/PhaseII_Final_Report_Revised_Oct_16_2006.pdf.  The Hardy
Flow Study represents the best current available science on the needs of fish in the
lower Basin.  The study was funded by the Bureau of Indian Affairs beginning in
1998.
302 Personal knowledge of the author. The Hardy Flow Study research plan was
originally proposed in 1996 by the Klamath Fishery Restoration Task Force, a Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act (FACA) committee charged with lower Klamath
River salmon habitat restoration on which the author sat for many years.  After
several votes over several meetings where the consensus necessary to approve the
study was repeatedly blocked by Upper Klamath Basin representatives on the Task
Force, the Task Force gridlock was over-ridden and federal agencies approved and
later funded the study over their protests.
303 Letter from Twelve Members of the House of Representatives to Gail Norton,
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, & Donald Evans, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce
(Aug. 13, 2003) (on file with author); Letter from Dianne Feinstein, Senator, to Gale
Norton, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, & Donald Evans, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce (Aug. 13, 2003) (on file with author).
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by the Bureau, presumably in hopes of securing different
results.304
Finalized only in October 2006, the Hardy Flow Study has not
yet been classified by the DOI as a final report, and Interior has
ordered yet a third peer-review by a special scientific panel of the
National Research Council, whose report on this, and the Bu-
reau’s competing flow study, is not due to be released until
2008—nearly ten years after the study was originally funded.305
Among other things, the Hardy Flow Study shows that
salmonids in the lower river need nearly twice the amount of
water the Bureau has been willing to provide during recent water
years under the 2002-12 BiOp.306
3. The Bureau of Reclamation’s “Undepleted Natural Flows”
Study
The Bureau of Reclamation, which runs the Klamath Irriga-
tion Project in the upper Basin, clearly did not like the implica-
tions of the independent Hardy Flow Study.
Therefore, in 2002 the Bureau commissioned its own counter-
study, published as the Undepleted Natural Flow of the Upper
Klamath River: A Summary Report , in an obvious effort to create
it own analysis to rebut the Hardy Flow Study.  Initial drafts of
this study were sharply criticized by a number of scientists inside
and outside the Basin and scientists from the tribes, and later had
to be substantially rewritten in order to withstand peer review.  It
has now been finalized but is being used in the water debate by
the Bureau primarily to forestall the full implementation of the
Hardy Flow Study’s flow recommendations for the lower river.307
304 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NATURAL FLOW OF
THE UPPER KLAMATH RIVER (2005), available at  http://www.usbr.gov/mp/kbao/
docs/undepleted_klam_fnl_rpt.pdf.
305 See supra  note 303. R
306 Compare HARDY FLOW STUDY, supra  note 301, at 182 tbl.27, and 2002 KLA- R
MATH PROJECT BIOP, supra  note 27, at 33 tbl.5.  The Hardy Flow Study not only R
highlights the depletion of water in the lower river but also the magnitude of over-
appropriation of water resources in the basin, principally for agricultural uses.
307 There has been written debate between the Bureau of Reclamation and Dr.
Hardy’s team over the legitimacy of the Bureau’s derived flows numbers that are the
basis for its study. See Letter from Pablo R. Arroyave, Area Manager, Klamath
Basin Area Office, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Water Sci. & Technology Bd., The
Nat’l Academy of Sci. (Sept. 27, 2006), available at http://www.engineering.usu.—
edu/uwrl/inse/klamath/report.html; Dr. Thomas Hardy, Inst. for Natural Sys. Eng’g,
Utah State Univ., to Pablo  Arroyave, Area Manager, Klamath Basin Area Office,
Bureau of Reclamation (Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://www.engineering.usu.edu/
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\22-1\OEL102.txt unknown Seq: 75 14-AUG-07 15:35
2007] Klamath Basin 123
4. Scientific Review of Fish Flows by the National Research
Council
Having two entirely different, and in places conflicting, hydro-
logical analyses of the flows of the Basin, each promulgated by
agencies within the DOI with conflicting mandates themselves,
clearly creates a number of serious problems for future Klamath
water-policy decision-makers.
In an effort to reconcile the conflicts between the Bureau of
Indian Affairs’ Hardy Flow Study and the Bureau’s study, in late
2005 former Secretary of the Interior Gail Norton ordered an
independent scientific panel review of the two studies and their
respective methodologies by the National Research Council.308
The Council then formed the Committee on Hydrology, Ecology,
and Fishes of the Klamath River Basin to assess the scientific
basis for both hydrological studies and make recommendations
for future policy.  That final report is due mid-2007.309
5. The Impact of the Clean Water Act and TMDLs
The CWA has also had an increasing impact on the Klamath
Basin, particularly through the requirement for the development
of total maximum daily load (TMDL) pollutant standards
throughout the Basin.310  Most of the streams in the Klamath Ba-
sin are classed as water-quality-limited under the CWA for one
or more water-quality parameters (e.g., temperature, sediment,
ammonia, etc.).311  A long-term process is now well underway to
uwrl/inse/klamath/FinalReport/Response_to_BOR_Letter-tbh.pdf.  In particular see
the Bureau’s criticism of the Hardy Flow Study based on its own flow study conclu-
sions, and Dr. Hardy’s rebuttal.  The National Research Council’s review will, how-
ever, add at least another eighteen months before it will be deemed a final
document.
308 The National Research Council is an independent scientific advisory division
of the National Academies of Science, which frequently is asked by federal agencies
or Congress to provide advice in scientific disputes.  The Nat’l Academies, The Na-
tional Research Council, http://www.nationalacademies.org/nrc/ (last visited May 5,
2007).
309 For the National Research Council’s Klamath Committee website, see the Na-
tional Academies, Project Information, http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/
projectview.aspx?key=216 (last visited May 5, 2007).
310 See  33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2006) (containing requirements for adoption by states of
TMDL standard for water-quality-limited streams).  Section 401(c) of the Act grants
states water certification authority over FERC licenses. Id.  § 1341.  Section 303 de-
tails the development process for TMDL standards to control pollutants. Id.  § 1313.
311 See  State Water Res. Control Bd., Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Proposed 2006
CWA Section 303(d) List of Water Quality Limited Segments, http://www.deq.state.
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establish TMDL water-pollution standards for most of these fac-
tors throughout the Basin.312  These TMDL programs are under
court-ordered deadlines, which require TMDLs to be adopted
for most northern California rivers by December 31, 2007.313
In addition to its CWA section 401(c) certification authority,
California also has independent, state statutory authority over
water quality, quite separate from the federal CWA, under the
California Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act.314  This
independent state authority is just beginning to come into play in
the Klamath Basin.  For instance, in February 2007, a petition
was filed with the California North Coast Regional Water Qual-
ity Control Board, asking it to assert independent state authority
under Porter-Cologne to regulate discharges of toxic microcystin
and the toxic blue-green algae Microcystis aeruginosa , as well as
elevated water temperatures, low dissolved-oxygen levels, and el-
evated pH levels from Iron Gate Dam.315  There is considerable
scope for both California and Oregon to assert regulatory control
over discharges into the Klamath River under their respective
water pollution control statutes, which to date neither state has
much used.
or.us/wq/assessment/rpt0406.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2007); Or. Dep’t of Envtl.
Quality, Water Quality Assessment Database, http://www.deq.state.or.us/wq/assess-
ment/rpt0406/search.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2007).
312 See  N. Coast Reg’l Water Quality Control Bd., Klamath River TMDLs, http://
www.waterboards.ca.gov/northcoast/programs/tmdl/klamath/klamath.html (provid-
ing information on the Klamath Basin TMDL development process and schedules
for implementation) (last visited May 1, 2007).  Though most of the Klamath Basin
lies within California, comparable programs for the Oregon portions of the Klamath
Basin are managed by the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality.  Or.
Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, Water Quality: Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) Pro-
gram, http://www.deq.state.or.us/wq/tmdls/klamath.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2007).
313 Consent Decree at 8, Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Marcus, No.
95-4474MHP (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 1997).   An extension of these deadlines for the
Klamath mainstem is under consideration by the plaintiffs.
314 Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act of 2006, CAL. WATER CODE
§§ 13000-14958 (West 2007).
315 Petition at 2, In re  Unauthorized Pollutant Discharges in the Klamath Basin,
(Cal. Reg’l Water Quality Control Bd. Feb. 20, 2007), available at  http://www.
waterboards.ca.gov/northcoast/agenda/03_2007/pdf/paccorp/070227_Final_Petition_
to_NC_RWQCB_re_PacifiCorp.pdf.  The petition was denied by the Regional
Board in May 2007 on purely jurisdictional grounds and will ultimately be decided
by the State Water Board.  The PCFFA and the IFR are both among the petitioners.
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III
GOVERNING AN UNGOVERNABLE BASIN
One of the forces confounding efforts both to remove Klamath
dams and to reallocate water more fairly is the fragmented politi-
cal and geographic nature of the Basin itself.
The Basin is huge—nearly the size of New England—as well as
sparsely settled.  Roads are generally very poor, and travel from
one part of the Basin to another for meetings is difficult and,
during some parts of the year, impossible.  Some lands, particu-
larly tribal lands occupied by the Yurok Tribe of California, do
not and have never had access to electricity.
The landscape is itself highly fragmented, with interspersed
state, federal, tribal, and private lands all intermixed, split be-
tween two states with different and sometimes conflicting laws.
The culture of the Basin is comprised of largely isolated, eco-
nomically poor, rural communities with little communication be-
tween the upper and lower Basin.
No one agency is in charge of or able to assert authority over
the Basin in such a way as to implement a comprehensive  resto-
ration plan.  Instead there is a multitude of state, federal, and
local agencies and local watershed-restoration groups.  None
have the authority, funds, or expertise to organize comprehen-
sive restoration planning, and some have conflicting mandates or
work at cross-purposes.  Political and jurisdictional fragmenta-
tion exacerbates problems of communication created by cultural
and geographic fragmentation and works against comprehensive
restoration.
However, there have been recent efforts to come to grips with
this political fragmentation.  Among the quasi-governmental
agencies that have been organized specifically for restoration
purposes include the Klamath Fisheries Restoration Task
Force,316 Klamath Fisheries Management Council,317 and Upper
316 The Task Force is organized under 16 U.S.C. § 460ss-3 but is wholly advisory
and has jurisdiction only over salmon restoration efforts below Iron Gate Dam.  16
U.S.C. § 460ss-3(j) (2006).  Its twenty-year congressional-funding authorization has
lapsed as of 2006, in accordance with 16 U.S.C. § 460ss-5.
317 The Klamath Fisheries Management Council, which advises the PFMC, is sep-
arately organized under 16 U.S.C. § 460ss-2. It is also an advisory body, and only
has jurisdiction over ocean fisheries within the Klamath Management Zone where
Klamath-origin fish generally migrate. KLAMATH FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, LONG-
TERM PLAN FOR MANAGEMENT OF HARVEST OF ANADROMOUS FISH POPULATIONS
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Basin Working Group.318  All were deliberately limited in scope
to small portions of the Basin due to political resistance by other
stakeholders at the time they were formed, and none have been
fully effective.
The need to overcome this fragmentation and craft a compre-
hensive, Basin-wide restoration plan is widely recognized.319  The
most recent effort to form a Basin-wide, stakeholder-driven res-
toration and coordination mechanism has been the Conservation
Implementation Program being pushed by the Bureau.320  How-
ever, many are suspicious of the Program since it was originally
proposed by the Bureau in the now-discredited 2002 BiOp as a
recommended and prudent alternative, more to avoid making
hard water-allocation decisions than to resolve them.321  Since
then, the concept has been slowly evolving but still remains
solely within the Bureau.  So far the Conservation Implementa-
tion Program has little stakeholder buy-in, no agreed-upon struc-
ture, and no membership, and has thus been almost entirely a
paper exercise by the Bureau.
OF THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN 16 (1992), available at  http://www.fws.gov/yreka/
kfmc-ltp-f.pdf.
318 The Upper Basin Working Group is also advisory, but is not organized under
FACA.  The Group was created by statute after former Senator Mark Hatfield ad-
ded a special rider to an appropriations bill, in Division B, Title II, section 201 of
H.R. 3610, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 201,
110 Stat. 3009, 3009-532 to -534 (1996).  The Working Group, however, is authorized
to deal only with Upper Basin restoration issues, has no lower river representation,
and has little or no contact with the Klamath Fisheries Restoration Task Force or the
Klamath Fishery Management Council.
319 “The social and jurisdictional fabric of the Klamath Basin is characterized by
fragmentation. . . .  The essential institutional quality of the Klamath River system is
a fragmentation of interests and authorities without compensating relationships for
conflict resolution and cooperation.” WATER ALLOCATION IN THE KLAMATH PRO-
JECT, supra  note 34, at 353-54.  The isolated, rural nature of the Basin’s communi- R
ties, plus the conflicting institutional mandates of the many agencies that support
these communities, have led some observers to characterize the Klamath as prima-
rily driven by cultural conflicts. See  Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms
and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath Basin , 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279, 336-39
(2003).
320 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, CONSERVATION IM-
PLEMENTATION PROGRAM (2007), available at  http://www.usbr.gov/mp/kbao/CIP/re-
ports/CIP-ProgramDoc-Draft3.pdf.
321 2002 KLAMATH PROJECT BIOP, supra  note 27, at 59-61. R
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IV
HOPE FROM RENEWED POLITICAL ATTENTION
As a result of first the drought-driven irrigation water crisis in
the upper Basin in 2001, then the federal agency overreaction
which diverted so much water that it caused a massive fish-kill in
2002 resulting in widespread ocean-salmon-fishery closures, plus
the ever-present threat of similar crises in the Klamath in the
near future, there is renewed media interest in the Basin.  Hope-
fully this attention will ultimately translate into renewed political
will to finally solve its many problems.
Unfortunately, the history of follow-through on political
promises for Klamath restoration has been poor.  Since 1986,
when the Klamath River Basin Fishery Resources Restoration
Act322 was adopted in response to major fisheries collapses in the
early 1980s, the Klamath River Basin Fisheries Restoration Task
Force has been grossly underfunded for the restoration problems
it was designed to address, and much of the promised funding has
never materialized.323  In 2002, the cabinet-level Klamath Basin
Federal Working Group was formed within the Bush administra-
tion to better coordinate federal Klamath restoration efforts and
to create an overall plan within eighteen months.  In the end,
little was done and no plan was ever developed to show for it.324
It has now quietly faded away.
Then in October 2004—just before the last presidential elec-
tion—Bush administration cabinet officials enlisted the Gover-
nors of both California and Oregon and signed a Klamath River
Watershed Coordination Agreement pledging, among other
things, to establish a state and federal Klamath Basin Coordina-
tion Group to “implement an aggressive, coordinated approach
to allocate existing resources to the extent possible toward short-
term opportunities that will improve conditions in the basin.”325
322 Klamath River Basin Fishery Resources Restoration Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-552, 100 Stat. 3080.
323 The Task Force was congressionally authorized to be funded at $1 million per
year for twenty years. See id. § 6, 100 Stat. at 3085.  However, the Task Force has
actually received somewhat less than that.  Given the scope of its restoration task,
this funding level is less than 1/10 what was annually needed.
324 Press Release, Klamath Basin Federal Working Group, Klamath Working
Group Holds First Meeting (Mar. 6, 2002), available at  http://www.doi.gov/news/
020308a.html.
325 State of California et al., Klamath River Watershed Agreement (Oct. 4, 2004),
available at  http://www.doi.gov/news/klamathagreement.pdf.
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After the election was over, the Coordination Group never met
and nothing changed.
In the meantime, much of the necessary federal funding for
true Klamath restoration work, such as the twenty-year-long ef-
forts of the Klamath Fisheries Restoration Task Force, has now
disappeared.  In some ways the Basin’s federal restoration efforts
are headed backward, not forward.  Many productive, stake-
holder-driven, and grassroots restoration efforts of the sort
touted by the Bush administration were supported with Task
Force funding, but will soon disappear without renewed federal
support.
Nevertheless, there is renewed hope.  The Governors of Ore-
gon and California are planning a Klamath Basin Summit in the
near future to try to address the needs of the Basin, including
funding the ultimate removal of the Klamath Hydroelectric Pro-
ject, and encouraging continuing settlement talks over broader
water-allocation issues.326  Only time, consistent funding, and fol-
low-up will tell whether these efforts succeed.
V
CONCLUSION
Change in the over-appropriated Klamath Basin is long over-
due.  The Klamath represents a textbook example of all that is
wrong with western water law and policy, including short-sighted
water-allocation schemes that do not take ecological or tribal
water needs into account, and that lead inevitably to widespread
water over-appropriation and escalating conflicts over declining
natural resources.
The Klamath is also an example of a once-productive salmon
river system nearly destroyed by past hydropower dam develop-
ment that did not take fisheries impacts into account, and has
caused far more harm to those economies dependent upon
healthy rivers, as well as to tribal subsistence economies, than
any economic benefits the dams could ever provide.  The now-
annual rotating water conflicts and fishery crises in the Klamath
seen for more than two decades are a clear symptom that the
326 Originally planned for late 2006, the Klamath Basin Summit has since been
postponed at the request of parties to the on-going settlement talks, but is still being
planned for sometime in late 2007 or early 2008.
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ecosystem of the Basin has been stretched to the breaking point
and the ecological status quo is no longer sustainable.
The health of the economies and communities of the Basin are
also inextricably linked to the health of its river.  The warning
signs of ESA listings for coho in the lower river, ESA listings of
resident fish in the upper river, and the fortuitous termination of
the fifty-year license for the Klamath Hydroelectric Power Pro-
ject are at last forcing much-needed reforms.  New political at-
tention to these problems promises institutional support for these
necessary transitions to help make them as painless as possible.
Economic stakeholders such as commercial fishermen and tri-
bal interests that have long been ignored have found new legal
tools in the ESA, CWA, and FERC relicensing process to pro-
mote much-needed watershed restoration and water reallocation.
These reforms have a far better chance of leading to an economi-
cally and ecologically sustainable Klamath Basin than in the past.
The lessons learned in the Klamath may also help resolve similar
problems in other basins.
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